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Many severe sentences 
for Muslims 
At least 129 Muslims have been sentenced in Indonesia 
since December 1984 in connection with political charges. 
Most were charged under the anti-subversion law. The vast 
majority of the trials followed the clampdown on Muslim 
activism in the wake of the Tanjung Priok massacre on 12 
September 1984. 
T APOL has records documenting 129 convictions since 
December 1984, though in the case of 6 of these 
convict ions, we have no record of the sentence passed. 
TAPOL's research on the Muslim trials is by no means 
complete; there is hardly any information about trials 
outside Java, for example. 
The breakdown of the 123 sentences known to us is as 
follows: 
Length of sentence Number of convictions 
Under 12 months 3 
From 12 to 24 months 39 
From 2 to 5 years 9 
From 6 to 9 years 26 
From 10 to 12 years 14 
From 13 to 15 years 16 
From 16 to 18 years 6 
19 or 20 years 6 
Life 2 
Death 2 
Breakdown by cases 
The people sentenced have been charged for alleged 
involvement in a variety of cases. Our records provide us 
with the following breakdown: 
Tonjung Priok related cases 
Four were convicted for spreading "false" reports in 
advance of the Tanjung Priok demonstration, and received 
between 18 and 30 months each. 
Seven were convicted for alleged crimes at the time of 
the Tanjung Priok demonstration and received 18 or 20 
months each. 
Twenty-eight were convicted for participating in the 
Tanjung Priok demonstration, and received from 12 to 36 
months each. 
Educational courses/Pesantren Kilat 
Seven were convicted in connection with the Pesantren 
Kilat/lslamic educational course in East Java. Six 
received from 8 to 20 years each, and one got a 1 ife 
sentence. 
Preachers 
Twelve were convicted for alleged I y subversive 
preaching. Their sentences varied from 5 to 20 years. 
"Illegal" pamphlets and subversive newspapers 
Eight were convicted for producing, reproducing or 
distributing pamphlets branded by the authorities as 
"illegal". Their sentences varied from 10 months to 15 
years. Two were convicted for editing or distributing an 
"i I legal" newspaper; one got 6 years, the other got 13 
years. 
Lese majeste 
Two were convicted for insulting the government or head 
of state . One got 12 months and the other 14 months. 
Subversion/conspiracy 
Two were convicted on subversion/conspiracy charges. 
One got 6 years, the other 7 years. 
Bombing incidents 
The people convicted of involvement in bombing 
incidents fall into several groups. E !even were convicted 
in connection with the 4 October 1984 bombings in 
Jakarta. They received between 10 and 19 years each. 
Seven were convicted in connection with bombing incidents 
in Central and East Java and received between 8 and 20 
years each. Three were convicted for stealing explosives 
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and got between 7 and 9 years each. 
Other Muslim trials 
There hove been many other convictions since December 
1984 for coses not connected with the Tonjung Priok 
massacre and subsequent crackdown. They inclu~e 5 charg:d 
for supporting Dorul Islam or NII (Indonesian Islamic 
State) who got between 9 and 16 years each. One was 
charged in connection with a congregation under Imron's 
leadership and got 8 years. Twenty-four were charged for 
"Holy-WarCommand"(KomandoJihad) activities; the lowest 
sentence was 4 years, and the highest sentence was death. 
An intrepid preacher gets eight years 
On 27 March, the West Jakarta District Court found 
Professor Oesmony Al Hamidy guilty of subversion and 
sentenced him to eight years. Although the defendant's 
"polite demeanour" was one of the contributing factors 
to the "lightness" of the sentence, Ham idy had lost no 
opportunity from the outset to pour scorn on the 
absurdities of the trial, legal as well as procedural. 
He resisted court pressure to receive legal aid, 
arguing: "I face the death sentence so let God be my 
defence." When the presiding judge insisted that the 
trial could not proceed without defence lawyers being 
present because the charges could result in a death 
sentence, Hamidy said, "That's for you to decide, so do 
as you l.ike" [ Kompas, 23 December 1985]. From then on, 
defence lawyers sat in on the hearings but, as far as we 
know, made no interventions throughout. Later, he 
expressed the opinion that "using defence lawyers is a 
ere way to get 18 or 20 years" [ Kompa$, 6 January 1986]. 
His professorial manner stood him in good stead in 
holding his own against the judges. On one occasion, he 
interrupted a judge with "don't cut me short or I'll go 
on strike against speaking". [ Kompas, 24 January]. 
He was unrelenting in his cynicism about the 
predetermined nature of trials for subversion, a point 
he argued cogently in his demurrer at the start of the 
proceedings. Nor did he have any respect for so-called 
democratic procedures, especially in summoning 
witnesses. When one witness was testifying about his 
alleged criticisms of government policy, Hamidy said he 
found the testimony incomprehensible. The witness 
answered B when he should have answered A. After another 
witness's testimony, his frank response was, "Stop 
telling fibs!" 
When confusion reigned during yet another . testimony, 
his wit was not lost on the public when he remarked: "It 
would have been far better to send the witness first to 
the Guntur Military Police Detention Centre to be 
rehearsed by interrogators. A 1 ittle torture would have 
made him tell the truth." [Jakarta Post, 6 and 13 
January]. And to those who cared to listen, he offered 
the advice: "Plug your ears with cotton wool when anyone 
starts discussing the 'sole-ideology'." In other words, 
see no evil, hear no evil ... ! 
The 'no-win' pattern of verdicts 
He often referred to verdicts passed as "tendencious 
and harsh", and exposed the capricious way 'light' and 
'heavy' sentences were doled out. Thus, one preacher, 
Osmany Al Hamidy in court. [Tempo, 5 April 1986] 
Salim Qadar, was told that his elderliness had been 
taken into account in giving him a 'lighter' sentence of 
20 years, while another, Vayon Hendrayana got a 'lighter' 
sentence of 20 years because of his youth [Tempo, 30 
November 1985). 
After the prosecutor demanded a sentence of 12 years, 
Hamidy said this was truly amazing, coming after a 
1 ifetime of preaching, "and from you, Sir, who are so 
young. Surely, you don't expect me last to 1997! And yet, 
the sentence you demand is so short!" [Berito Buono, 7 
February] 
After this particular hearing, illness prevent Hamidy 
from attending any more sessions til 1 mid-March, when he 
read out his 40-page defence statement from a wheel-
chair. (Hamidy is crippled with rheumatism.) He asked for 
exoneration but with no less verve. "Since Ratono 
(erstwhile student and preacher) has got 8 years, the 
court would be wise to give me one-eighth of that, not to 
deny that even that would be totally unjust". 
When, on the last day, his eight-year verdict was 
announced, the time for humour had passed: "I refuse to 
accept this. It is grossly unjust," and he straight away 
asked for a form to lodge an appeal [Tempo, 5 Apri 1). 
Bomber and education-course trials converge 
Four men charged with subversion, because of alleged 
involvement in bombing incidents, were sentenced on 7 
May in the East Java mountain town of Malang. The 
bombing incidents included an explosion at a Catholic 
community building in Malang on 24 December, 1984, 
explosions at the Borobudur monument in Central Java on 
21 January 1985 when nine stupas were damaged, and an 
explosion on a Pemudi bus in East Java while it was en 
route for Bali. 
To understand these verdicts, it is necessary lo 
explain briefly two previous groups of trials, also held 
in Malang. 
The first eventually resulted in convictions for four 
men who became known as the 'Pesantren K ilat generation' 
because of their involvement in Muslim education courses 
interpreted by the government as being the focus for 
revolutionary Islamic activity. Before and after the 
trials commenced in July 1985, there was total confusion 
in the press regarding how many were to be tried and on 
what charges. It was being suggested that the bombings 
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would figure in the churges, but in the event, they were 
not even mentioned. By that stage, several men were 
already being held for the Borobudur bombings, though 
they appeared in court not as defendants but as 
witnesses. 
One of these, Achmad Muladawila, testified at all four 
trials with devastating results not only for the four but 
also for himself and others named in his depositions. 
The four were all sentenced to 8 years, though two of 
these sentences were revised upwards on prosecution 
appeal, with the final results as follows: Andi Sukisno, 
15 years; Murjoko, 9 years; Faizal Fachri and Sugeng 
Budiono, both 8 years. 
The 'Borobudur bombing trials' 
Characteristically for all the subversion trials, a 
witness in one trial soon finds himself charged in the 
next. The second wave of trials were referred to as the 
'Borobudur bombing trials' although Achmad Muladawi la 
and the two others in this group were also charged for 
other bombing incidents in East Java. Achmod Mulodawila, 
25, had already effectively confessed his 'guilt' in 
earlier testimonies, though his precise role in the 
Borobudur incident remained unclear. 
He denied all knowledge of the explosives that were 
carried on the Pemudi bus heading for Bali, and which 
exploded prematurely. The other two on trial were 
apprehended after this explosion, while three others, 
also said to be involved, were killed on the bus. 
Dµring cross-examination in court, Muladawila denied 
involvement in other, unspecified incidents in Surabaya, 
regarding which, to our knowledge, nothing had 
previously been said. 
Whatever the substance of the case against Muladawi la, 
the prosecutor demanded a death sentence, but the court 
was a little more 'lenient' and gave him 20 years. 
The second defendant, who was picked up while he was 
fleeing from the Pemudi bus, was Abdul Kadir Ali Al-
Habsyi, 25, who admitted in court that he accompanied the 
group that planted the bombs in Borobudur, but insisted 
he hod been persuaded to do so by his older brother, 
enticed by financial considerations because he is 
unemployed and without any income. In any case, he was 
not present at the time of the Borobudur explosion as he 
had been sent back to Malang with a faulty device. 
His brother, Husein Ali Al-Habsyi has been "missing" 
since the Malang trials first commenced. Blind from 
birth, he is described as a 'fiery' and influential 
proselytiser, and is alleged to have 'master-minded' 
both this and other bombings. Another "missing" suspect, 
Ibrahim (alias Djawad), adds to the mystery. According 
to rumour, both are said to have made trips to Iran 
before and after the incidents. Needless to say, the 
mystery surrounding these two 'key suspects' has led to 
./ 
Repairing damaged stupas at Borobudur. [Tempo, 29 March 
1986] 
much speculation, plus unsubstantiated reports of 
conspiracy. The consequences for the men on trial have 
been catastrophic. Thus, younger brother Abdul Kadir, 
for al 1 his reluctance to join in the bombing of 
Borobudur and his apparently peripheral role, was given 
a sentence of 20 years. 
A third man, Abdulkadir Baraja, 41, was charged both 
in connection with the Pemudi bus explosion and the 
Borobudur affair. His part allegedly consists of having 
purchased the explosives. His trial received the most 
press coverage · because of his impassioned rejection of 
the proceedings and the contentious nature of testimonies 
regarding the purchase of the explosives. The 
prosecution charged that he hod bought these in 
Telukbetung, South Sumatra. For his port, the defendant 
repeatedly explained that explosives are used for 
fishing in Telukbetung. 
Then came contradictory testimony about the money used 
for the purchase. One witness, Mohammad Achwan, who has 
since been sentenced to life, claimed that he gave Baraja 
the money, but Basirun Sinene, a fisherman, hotly 
contested this, denying that Baraja had anything to do 
with it. It was he, Basirun, who had obtained the money 
direct from Achwan. Basirun's testimony in court differed 
from his testimony under interrogation, and his 
retraction in court suggests that the earlier evidence 
incriminating Baraja had been obtained under pressure. 
The confusion about who purchased the explosives was 
compounded because, at one of the earlier Molang trials, 
Achmad Muladawila had testified that it was a certain 
'MA' (Moh. Achwan?) who had done the purchasing. 
Whatever the case, Baraja got a 13-yeor sentence. 
The four latest sentences 
Once these trials were over, the courts launched into 
so-called "marathon" sessions to deal with the last (?) 
four "bomber trials". Three of these defendants, whose 
trials were only briefly mentioned in the press, were 
given verdicts of 8 years each. One was Basirun Sinene, 
who testified so controversially at Borajo's trial. He 
was found guilty of having sent explosives to the now 
"missing" Husein and Ibrahim in Malang via Moh. Achwon. 
The others were Sadiq Musawa and Abdul Kadir bin ldrus 
Al-Hado4 found guilty among other things of making 
reconnaisance trips to Bali where the Pemudi bus bombs 
were supposed to have been planted. In al 1 these cases, 
meetings at the homes of the "missing" Husein and 
Ibrahim, were included in the charges. The two were 
accused of being the "links" with an illegal organisation 
led by Husein and Ibrahim. 
Mohamad Achwan's trial 
MohammadAchwan, a cobbler aged 38, regularly featured 
in all the Malang "bomber trials" as the key prosecution 
witness, as well as in trials of several preachers in 
Surabaya last June. He helped secure convictions in so 
many cases that his role in all these events seemed very 
suspect. Yet, he hos not been spared. After all the 
"lesser fry" had been dealt with, his own trial opened in 
March and he was landed with the heaviest sentence of 
all. 
The charges spanned a wide range of activities, from 
overall responsibility for the Pesantren Kilat courses, 
to local bombings in East Java and the bombing in 
Borobudur. They also included involvement in the alleged 
assassination plot against Suharto, which appears to be 
the culmination of the regime's case against Muslim 
dissidence. 
Although reports of his impending trial have appeared 
in the press since ~une last year, it is certainly no 
coincidence that his trial was conducted at the same time 
as that of Mohammad Sanusi, alleged "godfather" of the 
assassination plotters. The two trials held together had 
the effect of dramatising the assassination charges. 
Everyone convicted in the earlier Malong trials had 
mentioned meetings attended by Achwan and Sanusi, said 
to have been held in Jogjakarta in 1982 at the office of 
T APOL Bulletin No. 75, Moy 1986 3 
the dissident Musi im pub I ication, Ar-Risalah, whose 
editor, Irfan Suryahodi, got a 13-yeor sentence earlier 
this year. 
At his own trial, however, Achwan denied that Sanusi 
had talked about assassinating the president, only that 
Sanusi had spoken of Suharto as being "not especially 
Muslim". But while this may have helped Sanusi a bit 
[though Sanusi denies ever even attending such a 
meeting), Achwon compared his own Islamic reformism as 
being like the gentle kroncong music, as compared to the 
"hard rock" revolutionary style of Sanusi and his lot. 
As with other trials, defence witnesses were notable by 
their absence, and several prosecution witnesses failed 
to appear in person, though written deposit ions were 
used. In sentencing Achwan to life, the court described 
Achwan as the "brains" behind the entire movement. After 
sentence was passed, Achwan announced that he would not 
appeal, but would only ask for clemency [Tempo, 17 May]. 
The Sanusi trial 
The second trial of Mohammad Sanusi, already serving a 
19 - year sentence for allegedly funding bombings in 
Jakarta in October 1984, commenced on 3 Apri I. He stands 
charged with being the ''master-mind" of several alleged 
plots to assassinate Suharto in 1982 and 1983. The trial 
will be reported fully in the new issue. 
Correction: 
Gajah Mada lecturers did take the witness stand in 
Irfan Suryahadi 's trial, contrary to our report in TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 74, March 1986, page 6. 
No decision yet on Buyung's right to practise 
Moves by the judiciary to bar Adnan Buyung Nasution, the 
well-known human rights lawyer, from practising as a 
lawyer appear so for to hove led to a stalemate, with no 
final decision yet in sight. On 19 March, the chairman of 
the Jakarta District Court issued an Administrative 
Decision proposing that the Minister of Justice revoke 
Buyung's practicing I icence because he had allegedly been 
in contempt of court on the final day of the Dhorsono 
trial. [See T APOL Bullet ii'\ No 74, March 1986, page 1.) 
Three months after the Court's move, L ieutenont-General 
(retired) Ismail Saleh, Minister of Justice, indicated 
that it still might be some time before a decision is 
taken. The Supreme Court must first make recommendations 
to the Justice Minister, he said, and before doing so, 
the Supreme Court would seek the views of the Jakarta 
District Court. The Justice Minister also said he would 
hear the views of Ikadin, the Indonesian Bar Association. 
[Kompas, 14 May] 
In fact, the impression is being created that the 
officials involved all wish to evade responsibility for a 
move that will prove very unpopular at home and abroad. 
Moreover, the Jakarta District Court chairman was clearly 
not acting within the I aw when he issued the 1 9 March 
Administrative Decision [Surat K eputusan Adm inistratif] 
and is now trying to wriggle out of his dilemma, by 
saying that this was not a "decision" but only a 
"report". (Tempo, 26 April] 
Going round in circles 
The following is a step-by-step account of the story so 
far: 
* On 5 February. the chC?irman of the Jakarta District 
Court sent a report of the incident on the last day of 
the Dharsono trial to the Supreme Court. This was four 
weeks after the incident. [According to the Procedural 
Code, the chairman should have reprimanded the lawyer on 
the spot.] 
* On 18 February, the Supreme Court instructed the 
Jakarta District Court to investigate the complaints 
against Buyung and make a recommendation regarding the 
action to be taken. 
* On 24 February, Buyung was summoned by the Jakarta 
District Court chairman and informed of the contempt of 
court complaint, and was told he would be required to 
submit a written statement, not later than 10 March, in 
his own defence. Buyung was refused a copy of the Supreme 
Court's instruction to the Jakarta District Court, and 
was therefore not able to discover the legal basis for 
the instruction. 
* On 10 March, Buyung wrote to the chairman of the 
Jakartp District Court objecting that the procedure 
being used was without legal foundation. He pointed out 
that no implementary regulations for Law No 14/1985 on 
the Supreme Court and Law No 2/ 1986 on the Courts have 
yet been issued. Buyung announced that he was therefore 
not prepared to submit a written · defence. 
* On 19 March, Buyung was served a copy of the Jakarta 
District Court's Administrative Decision recommending 
that the Minister of Justice revoke his 1 icence to 
practice. Yet, no formal charges had been made, nor had 
there been any hearing. The Court gave Buyung one month 
in which to lodge an appeal. 
But since the Court is now saying that the 19 March 
Decision was not a "decision" but a "report", there is no 
question of Buyung making an appeal. 
Buyung: "It's only a matter of time" 
Meanwhile, Buyung himself has no illusions about the 
threat lie now faces. "My suspension in only a matter of 
time," he said in a recent interview [Volkskrant, 2 May]. 
"It is basically a political matter. The authorities 
don't want me to function any more as a lawyer." 
On the Dharsono trial, he said: "The trial was widely 
reported ... al though the press carefully avoided reporting 
Dharsono's personal attacks on the Palace ... The trial 
created quite an upheaval in society, penetrating into 
military circles, especially among the younger officers. 
It was also well reported in the foreign press." 
He went on: "Suharto watched the trial on video 
recordings mode by m iii tary i nte II i gence. He is now very 
angry towards (me) because things developed differently 
than expected. In our feudal military system, when the 
king gets upset, his subordinates must display even 
greater anger as proof of their loyalty. Thus everyone, 
from ministers, the chair of Parliament and of course 
Armed Forces commander, Benny Murdani down, has issued 
statements showing disapproval of me.11 
"The core of the problem is not Musi im fundamentalism. 
It is the social and economic situation, the political 
pressure, and the fact that no-one is allowed to express 
opinions any more.11 
Adnan Buyung 
Nasution. [NRC 
Handelsblad, 5 Moy, 
1986) 
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EVERLASTING PRISONERS 
Pramoedya recalls 14 years 
of detention 
Dutch journalist, John Jansen van Galen, interviewed writer and ex- prisoner Pramoedya Ananta Toer, in Jakarta earlier 
this year. His efforts to take a look at Buru Island, Pram's place of detention for ten years, proved fruitless, but he 
did published much of the interview [Hoagse Post, 5 April], from which the following extracts are taken. 
"The maximum results of our freedom is that now we are half free, half tapols -
everlasting political prisoners." Pramoedya Ananta Toer. 
"Brought to safety" 
In October 1965, an excited crowd gathered, and started 
showering Pramoedya's house with stones. It was the 
dawning of Suharto's coup and the writer had been branded 
a left extremist. He had been warned. A friend had told 
him to leave the area, as a gang of rioters would be 
bound to make their way to his home, after which the 
military would put things in order. 
But he stayed where he was, with his brother who had 
just returned · from studying in the Soviet Union. 
Pramoedya put out the lights and armed himself with a 
ladies' samurai. Stones shattered the glass, and he hurt 
his thigh. Then suddenly, as if from nowhere, soldiers 
loomed. He now learned the new meaning form enga m ankan, 
or "brought to safety" .... Tortured cellmates, filthy 
jai Is, bitter hunger. 
He was transferred to Nusakembangon, off the south 
coast of Java, which had been on island for prisoners in 
the Dutch period. The Dutch had made the prisoners do 
forced labour on the sugar plantations. In the 
quartermaster-sargeant's shed, Pram saw a notice on the 
board saying that 40 per cent of the prisoners on 
Nusakembangan had died .... 
Journey to a new Ii fe 
"On 16 August 1969, we were loaded onto a ship of the 
Indonesian Army, the ADR I-XV. At ~pm, we set off in an 
easterly direction. Over the ship's loudspeakers, we 
heard: "Gentlemen, we wish you a pleasant journey to a 
new life." It seemed like a remarkable new life. 
"In the hold where we were kept behind iron doors, 
a I together 500 of us, a layer of excrement spread over us 
as we lay on the floor, every time the stern was lifted 
by the waves. The ADR I- XV was an ol c:! vesse 1 of 30,000 
tons. She moved badly. Every now and then the engine 
broke down, which left us bobbing up and down for hours. 
Most of us were village people, who had never even seen 
the sea before. Everyone was promptly seasick. 
"Then there was a rumour that we were on the way to 
Buru Island and were due to arrive on 17 August, 
independence day. I don't think that was a coincidence. 
The regime intended our shipment as a gift to the 
population." 
Buru Island 
"When we reached Buru, there was no - one to be seen. Al 1 
the houses were closed tight. The outrigger canoes had 
been left ' moored at the water's edge. There wasn't a 
morlal to be seen. Nam lea, the capital, was empty, a dead 
town. Later, we heard that the authorities, alluding to 
our yellow prison clothes, had told the population, 'The 
yellow army wi 11 soon be coming. They are thieves, 
murderers and rapists. So clear off!' " 
Directly after the tapols arrive in Nomlea, they were 
taken to the Way Apo estuary, where Kaki Air (literally, 
"the foot of the water") Kampung is situated. From there, 
they had to continue by foot. 
"Just imagine! People who had been in prison four 
years, suffering from hunger, some of whom hod never left 
Two more Pramoedya books banned Pramot .. qa Ananta Totr 
Two books by Indonesia's foremost writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, have been 
banned by the Attorney General. One is Jejak Longkoh [FootstepsL the third 
book in a quartet of novels based on the life of Tirtoadisurjo, the 
initiator of the tradition of critical journalism in Indonesia. The other 
is Song Pemulo [The Originator], which is a historical account of the same 
journalist's I ife. 
The two books were published in Jakarta by Haste Mitra last September, 
and have been on sale in Indonesia since then. 
The ban, which covers possession, sale and distribution of the books, was 
issued on 1 May by the Attorney-General, Major General (retired) Hori 
Suharto. However, the letter informing the publishers which was dated 10 
May, did not arrive unti 1 14 May. 
The reasons given ore that the books are based on social disharmony and 
class conflict, and that the writer practises "sosialisme realis" (sic) or 
realist socialism which is described as part of the Marxist ideology. 
An advertisement f« Sang Pe m ula that appeared in Tempo, 17 Moy 1986. 
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their cells. Now, they had to make their way through 
dense forest where there was no recognisable footpath. 
Many didn't have the strength to drag their own bodies 
along. I still remember some who were 160 centimetres in 
height but weighed less than 30 kilos. Those like me who 
were reasonably healthy supported the famished. 
"The forest was humid and stuffy, the heat unbearable. 
We got blisters. All around us were trees with scorched 
crowns, which had obviously been struck by lightening. We 
could oniy hear birds, and didn't see a single ape. 
Someone sighed: 'If apes can't live here, then humans 
can't either." 
Life! Yes, we can live here 
"We cut across the meanders of the Way Apo where the 
waters had dried up or where the channels were marshy. 
Occasionally, we came across pools of clear water with 
shoals of fish, muja.hir. And every time I saw them, a 
voice within me said: "Life! Yes, we can live here." 
Only after dork did the miserable procession reach the 
camp. The distance of less than four kilometres had taken 
eight hours. The deadly weary men discerned a strange 
sort of animal on a scarcely cleared plain. These were 
the huts that would serve as their dwellings. The walls 
were of fresh sago leaves which at first glance, looked 
like animal fur. The rest of the camp, which would now 
have to accommodate 10,000 men and later on, 16,000, had 
yet to be bui It by the tapols themselves. 
"At roll-call on the first day, someone saw a lizard 
shoot past. He caught it, roosted it and ate it. You had 
to catch every living creature because no meat was 
provided and you could get ill from lock of protein. But 
we had more meat than in Nusakembongan. We ate cats, dogs 
and even crocodiles, and an awful lot of mice until one 
day I slit one open. It was full of worms, underneath its 
skin, in its belly, and going right into its heart." 
Writing without paper 
What was the meaning of the strange message, "Buru. 
Spoken, 1973. Written, 1975" which stood at the end of 
his two books, This Earth of Mankind and Child of all 
Nations? 
"It shows the conditions we had to I ive under on that 
island, that it was impossible to write. I did try, but 
it didn't work. The forced labour was incredibly hard and 
it sapped all my energy. There was no writing equipment. 
When I coold, I would buy some chickens and send off the 
eggs in exchange for writing material, but this was 
snatched by the joi lers. 
"To make sure I kept mentally fit, to train my memory 
and to give my friends some divers~on, I bega,n to te~l 
them the story of Njai Ontosoroh [principal character in 
This Earth of Mmkind). It was passed from mouth to mouth 
through the whole camp. It helped give everyone new 
courage. It gave inspiration to the lads on Buru who had 
totally withered and faded. 'Just take a look at what a 
woman 1 ike Njai Ontosoroh achieved.' " 
For a while, he was kept in solitary confinement. Even 
then, he succeeded in passing on the daily instalment of 
his spoken serial via friends at the daily roll-call. 
Then, after being on Buru for five years,. a new camp~ 
commander arrived. The man was an opportunist. He offered 
opportunities to prisoners with talents the chance to use 
their talents in the comps. So Pram seized the 
opportunity with both hands. 
1986: A family wedding 
Pram looked slender and frai I, older than his sixty or 
so years. Years in prison obviously count double. 
He was the only one in the wedding procession not 
wearing ceremonial dress. He wore a blue suit and a peci, 
the block cap typical of Muslim men. His daughter had her 
face pointed according to tradition, and at the back of 
her wedding attire, she had a Javanese k.ris strapped 
under her sash. 
"I don't know anyone who hates the Javanese more than 
Pram, and yet is so Javanese himself," whispered Jusuf, 
his publisher. 
But as father of the bride, he hod consented to a 
traditional wedding, where he solemnly handed over his 
daughter to her husband and accepted a symbolic dowry in 
return. 
People crowded together for the congratulations, then 
afterwards crowded round the tables of food. In an 
extended, bare room, a rather pompous-looking ice 
concoct ion was melting, ohd the guests sat stiffly in 
long rows of high-backed chairs, waiting. 
"Here in this room,'' said Pram's publisher, "is 
gathered hundreds of years of experience of being behind 
barbed wire and bars." Most of those present were ex-
tapols, former political prisoners, many of them 
journal is ts, lawyers, pub I ishers. 
The conversation was all about extortion. They were now 
free, but sti 11 suspect. Many positions were closed to 
ex-tapo Is, and they were rare I y chosen even for the jobs 
that were al lowed. It was too much trouble for employers 
to report to the pol ice every month about their suspect 
employees. They could only move house with the permission 
of the authorities. For every trip out of town, they 
needed official permission, and they weren't al lowed to 
go abroad .... 
What more does Suharto want to do with them? 
From our special correspondent in Ja. va.. 
It is now about a year since the Army security conmand, 
Kopkamtib [Operational Corrrnand for the Restoration of 
Security and Order], through its regional and local 
corrrnands, the Kopkamtibda and Kora.mil, started re-
investigating and checking former members of the now-
banned leftwing parties and mass organisations, as well 
as members of their families. These activities ore also 
being undertaken by so-called 'screening teams'in every 
government deportment and agency. Their tasks are: 
• To check, control and supervise their homes, places of 
work and activities. 
• To carry out new purges of former members of leftwing 
parties or moss organisations and members of their 
families, in various civilian and military governrrent 
bodies. 
• To compile data about the number of these people and 
decide whether to give them 'the right' to vote in the 
1987 elections, so as to increase votes for the 
government's party, Golkar. 
• To intimidate them, making them too afraid to do 
anything that could be regarded as harmful to the 
government. 
Both direct and indirect methods are being used: 
Direct control 
Summoning all former topols [ta.hana.n politik, or 
political prisoners] in a sub district [keca.ma.tan] and 
calling their names out one by one, checking where they 
live, where they sleep at night, where they work, who 
their friends are, and telling them that checks will be 
made on them in their homes at any tirre, without warning. 
This happened for instance in Jogjakarta. Rusmi Dahono, 
who Ii ves in Parakan Kampung, Kecamatan Mergangsan, hod 
a job outside the district so he wasn't at home when his 
home was checked. He was summoned by the Jogjakarta 
Kodim [m ii itary district command] and punished by .being 
ordered to work for Kodim for about two months without 
pay. This spread fear among all ex-tapols and their 
families, binding them to their homes. As a result, their 
efforts to try to earn a living were severely damaged. 
In mid 1985, a nurrher of former members of now-banned 
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organisations living in Utankayu, East Jakarta, together 
with members of their families, were all summoned for re-
registration. The initials 'ET', which stands for 'ex-
tapol', were then marked on their identity cards, even 
though none of them hod ever been in detention. 
Indirect control 
This form of control is usuallr employed through the 
village authorities [kelurahan and koromils at a 
person's place of work. As a result of this kind of 
thing, two lecturers at the Molang Institute of Education 
[IKIP] were dismissed because their parents were alleged 
to have been 'ex'. [This term is repeatedly used by our 
correspondent, to mean either former political rrisoners 
or former members of now-banned organisations. Another 
person dismissed was the camat [sub-district head] of 
Lumajang, whose father was murdered during the anti-
communist massacres in late 1965 when he was still a 
small child. He was later seht away from home by his 
mother and was brought up by his uncle. 
An army major in the Udayona Military Command which is 
based in Bali, who had been transferred to Irion Jayo and 
was about to be appointed as a bupati [district head1 
was dismissed when it was discovered that his parents 
were 'ex'. 
Three pensioners in Jogjakarta who live in Mergangsan 
sub-district were discovered to have been former members 
of a leftw ing organisation and were ordered to attend 
roll-calls once a month. In Jogjckarto, roll-calls are 
held once every two months for all those classified as B-
category [the more serious classification for 'non-
triable' leftwing political prisoners arrested in the 
late 1960s]. All those classified as C-category are 
required to attend a roll-call once every three months. 
In Semarang, there are roll-calls once a month for all 
the so-called 'unruly' people among the 35 tapols 
released in 1979. 
In many enterprises the need for redundancies because 
of the economic recession is being used to justify 
dismissing people on the basis of investigations by 
'screening teams' approved by Kopkamtib and Kopkamtibda. 
This happened in Caltex several months ago. Former 
members of the banned seamen's union SBPP, as well as 
former members of the banned SBPU still working in the 
Public Works Department, and ex trade unionists in other 
agencies, were also dismissed like this. When such a 
blanket justification is used to dismiss people, it 
becomes impossible for them to protest against their 
dismissal or fight it in any way. 
Others dismissed after being found to be 'ex' were 
teachers and local government officials in Gunung Kidul 
district in Central Java. 
Nor should we forget the fate of the 'ex' fam ii ies in 
vi I loges affected by the Kedong Ombo dam, in Central 
Java. They are not being permitted to transmigrate. Their 
fate still hangs in the balance; while others will be 
helped to move before the waters flood their land, the 
'ex' families wil 1 be left there, exposed to any 
potential danger. 
Secret Kopkamtib circular 
On 4 July last year, Kopkamtib issued a secret circular 
with an instruction to all Kopkamtibdas and Koramils that 
ex-tapols were not to be allowed to move to another sub-
district, nor even allowed to move homes within the same 
sub-district, until after the 1987 general elections. 
This has caused serious problems for many of our friends. 
Some, for example, had already moved, but were forced to 
return to their former place of residence where they have 
no place to live. This kind of difficulty is also being 
experienced by former members of so-called extreme 
rightwing organisations. 
Anyone applying for a job in government service must 
complete a form with questions about their family 
background, and whether anyone in their family was 
formerly in a (banned) organisation. If it turns out that 
the applicant's family includes an 'ex', they are 
'advised' to withdraw their application. 
All these difficulties come on top of the difficulties 
caused by government spokesmen, speaking for Kopkamt ib, 
Kopkamtibda and other commands, alleging that ex-tapols 
are engaging in political activities, even though the 
authorities know very well that virtually everything the 
ex-tapols do is connected with their efforts to make a 
living, to provide for themselves in the remaining years 
of their lives, and to provide for their wives and 
children. 
Speeches I ike this are commonplace these days, and are 
intended to rem ind people that the present government 
came to power in the wake of a clampdown on the leftwing 
movement. 
One thousand 'ex-PKI' people have 
11d i sappearecl' 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sonny Soedarsono, Social-Political 
Directorate Chief in East Kalimantan, claimed recently 
that one thousand (the exact figure) 'ex-PK I members' 
have "disappeared" from the province and are unaccounted 
for. There should have been 6,870 according to previous 
figures, but when re-registration for the 1987 elections 
took place, only 5,870 turned up. Surely, he said, not 
more than a hundred or so could have died in the past 
five years. So, where are the rest? 
Making the whole thing sound as sinister as possible, 
he suggested that they must have "disguised their 
identities, moved to new addresses, changed names and 
altered their appearances". He realised they would hove 
had difficulty getting re-absorbed into society, finding 
jobs and so on, but said the government is determined to 
seek them out, wherever they ore. 
As for the remaining 5,870 people, it had been decided 
that 309 w i 11 not be al lowed to vote next year [Sinor 
Harapon, 12 May]. What it was they had done to lose the 
right to vote, the I ieutenant-colonel did not bother to 
explain. 
Islamic University discussion 
broken up 
Soldiers and police entered and broke up o discussion 
being held by the Law Faculty of the Indonesian Islamic 
University (UII) in Jogjakarta. [Ull is not a state 
university, It is run by the Muslim organisation, 
Muhommadiyah.] The participants were ordered to disperse, 
and two students were taken away for questioning. 
The chair of the Faculty's Student Senate said students 
had autonomy on campus and had the right to organise 
campus discussions without external interference. The 
dissolution of this gathering was therefore very 
regrettable. About 70 people were attending the 
discussion. One of the students questioned later said the 
police had declared that permits were required for such a 
meeting. 
STOP PRE SS 
West Papuan Deportee returns to Vanimo 
One of the 12 West Papuans forcibly deported to Indonesia 
last October has returned to PNG ofter being tortured in 
a Jayapura prison. Aben Pagawak, 31, of Kilila Village, 
one of the deportees released by the Indonesians after 
several months in detention, said they hod been tortured 
to get information about the OPM [PNG Times, 31 Moy] 
Bishop John Etheridge, Bishop of Vonimo, criticised the 
PNG authorities for putting the man on trial for illegal 
entry, and sentencing him to two months' hard labour. 
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The Suharto family takes 
a battering 
An article in the S1jdne1J Horning Herald on to April, describing the business connections and corrupt dealings of ~he 
Suharto famillJ brought widespread retribution from Jakarta against Australian interests. The clampdown on Australian 
j ournalists e ven soured the atmosphere during Reagan's visit to 8 ali. The row that developed between Jakarta and Canberra 
reveals underlying discord oYer each country's defence strategies, and could have a profound impact on relations between 
the two countries. But Jakarta's reaction also signals that unitlj within the militarlJ is under severe strain. 
The Suharto fanily wealth 
The article by David Jenkins, foreign editor of the 
paper, gives details of the "assets of between $2 and $3 
billion piled up by the family and business associates of 
President Suharto ... who have waxed fat on government 
capital". Ent i tied "After Marcos, now for the Soeharto 
bill ions", the article focuses particularly on Mrs 
Suharto (according to one joke, she is in the mining 
business, "that's mine, that's mine") and sons, daughters 
and other close relatives. But in fact, it contains 
little that is new; much of the information has already 
been published, among others in the Far Eastern Economic 
Review [7 April 1983]. This was surnnarised in TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 57, May 1983, page 15]. 
The fury unleashed in Jakarta reveals how much the 
country's military ruler resents having the truth about 
himself brought out into the open. The repercussions were 
wide-ranging: 
* A visit to Australia by B.J. Habibie, chief of 
Indonesia's fast-growing weapons industry, during which 
he was due to assess the possibility of joint 
technological ventures, was called off. 
* A visit to Australia by Mario Carrascolao, puppet 
governor of East Timor, which would in any case have been 
greeted by demonstrations from East Timorese cornnuni ties 
in several Australian towns, was indefinitely postponed. 
* Further talks on the joint exploitation of oil in 
the waters between Australia and East Timor - the so-
called Timor Gap - were postponed. 
* An Australian film crew due to mc:ke a film in Bali 
in late May was unable to proceed as planned and has 
decided to shift on-location shooting to Thailand. 
* Yet more restrictions on Australian journalists 
working in Indonesia were imposed. They will not be 
allowed to enter Indonesia for the foreseeable future, 
and the two journalists still working there are unlikely 
to have their permits renewed. 
* Despite strenuous efforts by the US ambassador to 
Jakarta, Paul Wolfowitz, two Australian journalists 
attached to the White House press corps, who were to have 
covered Reagan's visit to Bali, y.<ere refused entry at 
Bali airport. They were unceremoniously ordered back onto 
a plane and forced to leave the country, giving the 260 
journalists accompanying Reagon on his "winds of freedom" 
Asia trip a direct insight into press control under 
military rule. 
Petition-of-50 throw down challenge 
The Indonesian press has fallen into line, making all 
manner of accusations against the Australian media and 
Australians in general. It has also refrained from 
telling readers what the article was all about. This is 
not to soy that many Indonesians don't know, for the 
offending article hos been widely circulated, having 
become the most widely-photocopied document in years. 
The dissident Petition-of-50 group responded by issuing 
a statement (not published in the Indonesia press) 
challenging the government to tell the public what 
caused the current row with Australia. The details should 
be mode public, it said, and the govermient should give 
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its side of the story. If the article is untru~, the 
paper should be sued for libel [Sydney Morning Herald, 19 
April]. 
Whether or not inspired by this adv ice from some of its 
most strident critics, a prominent merrf>er of the Suharto 
family announced a few weeks later that he would be suing 
the writer and hos sought advice from British and 
Indonesian lawyers [The Australian, 7 Moy]. The action, 
if it ever reaches court, should provide a field-day for 
those interested in investigating the Suharto billions. 
Suharto's step-brother, Probosutedjo, alleged that no 
comparison could be mode between Suharto and the deposed 
Ferdinand Marcos. His claim that Mrs Suharto "hos never 
sought a 10 per cent cornni'ssion" (Jenkins having referred 
to her nick-names, Mrs Ten Per Cent and Mrs Fifi - fifty-
fifty) must have caused smiles of derision on many faces 
in Jakarta. 
Army leadership lifts row to new 
heights 
Although everyone in the upper echelons of the regime 
joined in the chorus of abuse against all things 
Australian, to prove their undying loyalty to Indonesia's 
humiliated dictator, it is the Army leadership, toking 
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its cue from Armed Forces corrmonder, General Benny 
Murdoni, that hos pushed the issue the farthest. Their 
response suggests that, whatever Jenkins' intentions may 
hove been, the article hos hod a destablising effect 
within the Armed Forces. Moreover, their response hos 
brought into the open the underlying distrust between the 
defence establishments in Indonesia and Australia. 
It wps on 21 April, just as the chorus of anger seemed 
to be subsiding, that Murdani refuelled the row by 
threatening to end defence contacts with Australia, and 
to put a stop to oil military co-operation agreements. He 
warned that "the Indonesian armed forces feel obliged to 
defend the honour of the head of State and his family" 
[Sydney Morning Heral<t 22 April]. 
The way Murdoni phrased his defence of Suharto suggests 
that he was sendi ,ng warning signals to many ranking 
officers who are less than happy with Suharto and his 
family. Inside sources report that many younger-
generotion generals have adopted the slogan: 'We are 
loyal to the Armed Forces, not to any individual". In 
other words, Murdani knows that the renewed public 
interest in Suharto's billions 'Could encourage those now 
climbing up in the hierarchy of the Armed Forces to 
criticise the top leadership. 
Australian tourists hit 
The day ofter Murdani 's intervention, Indonesia 
suddenly announced that visa-free entry for all 
Australians was withdrawn. When a planeload of tourists 
landed in Bali that morning without visas and were 
ordered to leave irrmediotely, angry scenes ensued. Their 
m..rch-publicised return home to Sydney lifted the whole 
issue onto the front pages of the tabloid press. 
Bock in Indonesia, some ministers were horrified at the 
implications of this latest twist and rushed to Suharto, 
pleading for a reversal of this decision. The Great 
Leader consented, but by now, the Australian Government, 
up to Prime Minister Hawke himself, had decided that 
things hod gone too for, and criticised Indonesia for its 
"capricious repudiation of the rights of Australians to 
visit Indonesia". 
Real source of the row 
It was now downing on Australian Labour politicians 
that, regardless of the climb .. down over the visa blunder, 
the Armed Forces leadership in Jakarta had decided on 
all-out confrontation with Australia. The signs were not 
only Murdani's belligerent entry into the fray but a 
3,000-word article published in the Armed Forces daily, 
Angkatan Bersenjata on 21 and 22 April accusing 
Austral ions of "arrogance and conceit" towards Southeast 
Asia, and claiming that Australia's notional defence 
thinking is dominated by a "threat from the north" phobia 
[Sydney Momey Herald, 24 Apri I]. 
A week later, Angkaton Bersenjata further raised the 
heat with a general attack on Australia's new defence 
strategy which is to be made public shortly in a special 
report known as the Dibb Report. This Report assesses 
Australia's only "security threat" as coming via the 
island chains to the north and discusses the scenario of 
an invasion through or from the Indonesian archipelago, 
with maps identifying ports of Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea as being "of direct military interest" to 
Austrolid [The Australian, 9 April]. 
In fact, Canberra has been worried for some time that 
the Dibb Report will upset the military regime, and sent 
Defenc·e Minister Beazley to Jakarta at the end of March 
to soften Jakarta's predictable reaction. Although 
reports during and after Beazley's visit gave . the 
impression that Suharto and his generals might hove bee.n 
convinced, on article in An9<otan Bersenjata on 29 April 
bluntly accuses Australia of "aiming their arms at 
Indonesia's back". It argues that Australia is 
disappointed over Indonesia winning control of East 
Timar, Irion Joya [West Papua] and the South Moluccas 
"which could hove served as Australian fronts" [as quoted 
in The Age, 1 May). This new conflict puts the Jenkins 
article dispute into the shade, and signifies that 
Canberra-Jakarta relations ore in for a rough ride for 
some time to come. 
Hawke promises to stop "grovelling" 
The ultimate humiliation of Canberra's policy towards 
Indonesia since the Hawke Government took office came 
when Prime Minister Hawke declared that his government 
would not now hove a "grovelling relationship" with 
Indonesia. "I think perhaps there hos been a 
tendency ... to overstate the importance of the 
relationship" [Financial Review, 5 May]. 
East Tim or and West Papua, the victims 
of Canberra's grovel I ing 
The bitter irony of Canberra's sudden confrontation 
with Jakarta lies in the despicable way the interests of 
the East Timorese and West Papuons have been sacrificed. 
Like all Australian governments before it, the Hawke 
Government hos fallen over itself to appease the 
generals. The most shocking example is 1--tawke's 
proclamation lost August, givin9 unqualified recognition 
to Indonesia's illegal annexation of East Timor and 
referring to East Timorese as "citizens of Indonesia", 
and his government's blind refusal to grant political 
asylum to West Papuans who have token refuge in the 
Torres Straits islands. 
Hawke and Hayden ore now reported to feel aggrieved 
that Jakarta has repaid them so thanklessly for their 
strenuous efforts to reverse Labour Porty policy on East 
Timor two years ago. This is small comfort to the 
Timorese and Papuan people whose right to self-
determination hos been traded so cheaply. 
There ore moves now afoot in the Labour Party to press 
for a reversal to its former platform of support for East 
Timor self-determination. With Australian-Indonesian 
relations in tatters, pressure is expected to grow in the 
Labour Party for o change. This cou Id mean that the East 
Timor issue and that of support for West Papua's struggle 
for self-determination will dominate the Porty's national 
conference in July. 
Second FEE R correspondent out 
The Far Eastern Economic Review has lost its second 
correspondence in Jakarta in two months. Poul Handley 
fol lowed Lincoln Kaye in being told to leave lost month. 
The Review (22 May) published on article by Handley, 
"Coming to the defence of the family business" which 
provides new disclosures about the Suharto family's 
business affairs. By this time, however, the journal no 
longer hod anyone in Jakarta, only a phone number!' 
'Jenkins-style documents' circulating in E. Java 
The East Java mi 1 i tory commander hos ordered the 
pub! ic to hand in to the authorities copies of on 
"illegal document" now circulating widely in several 
East Java cities. While not divulging the contents, 
Major-General Syaiful Sulun said the document, 27 
pages long, contains information and analysis 
regarding economic, social, cultural and political 
developments under the New Order. 
He said it followed the style of the "olchoholic 
journalism" [a term coined by the Information 
Minister] practised by David Jenkins in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, except that it contained a lot of 
opinions as well. 
Sinor Haropan [25 Apri I] reports too that anonymous 
phone-calls hove been received, urging people who 
acquire copies of the 27-page document to make 
photocopies and spread them further. 
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Human rights overshadows 
Reagan-Suharto get-together 
Despite stre nuous efforts by the US Administration to avoid raising human rights during President Reagan's recent visit 
t o Bali, Indon esi an repression dominated press coverage. Both Reagan and Schultz were eventually forced to take up the 
issue. Viola t ions in East Ti mar were pushed onto the agenda by nearly 150 members of Congress, while Asia Watch lobbied 
on a wi de range of issues. The expulsion of three foreign journalists from Bali on the day Reagan arrived was tl1e final 
blo w to Washington's hopes c,f keeping the top-level encounter free of "unpleasant" issues. 
The Asia Watch dossier 
Shortly before Reagan left Washington to attend the 
Tokyo surrmit, visiting Bali on the way to meet President 
Suharto, the Asia Watch published a comprehensive dossier 
on Human Rights Concerns in Indonesia. This is the first 
time such lobbying hos been carried out in the US. 
The Asia Watch Corrmittee was set up by the Fund for 
Free Expression in 1985 to promote human rights in Asia, 
and is affiliated with the Americas Watch and Helsinki 
Watch Comnittees. In February this year, the Asia Watch 
sought permission to send a fact-finding mission to 
Indonesia but was told no decision would be token till 
ofter the Reagon visit. As a result, the April 1986 
dossier is described only as a statement of concerns, and 
raises a nurrber of questions intended for discussion 
later with Indonesian officials. 
The issues raised in the 31-poge dossier include free 
association and the impact of the repressive Societies' 
Low imposing the sole-principle obligation, detention 
without trial and lack of due process, continuing 
persecution of nearly two million former political 
prisoners and PKI suspects, the execution in 1985 of 
four long-term political prisoners, the current spate of 
subversion fr ials ago inst Muslims, extra-judicial 
killings, press control, tightened control on trade 
union .rights, abuses against human rights lawyers, the 
continuing abuses in East Timor and West Papua [Irion 
Jayo], and free access for relief and human rights 
organisations. 
[Copies of the dossier are available, price $3.00, from 
the Asia Watch, 739 Eighth Street, SE, Washington DC 
20003.J 
Congressional concern about East Timor 
East Timor was placed on the agenda by two letters, one 
addressed to Secretory of State Schultz from 23 Senators 
and one addressed to President Reagan from 122 merrbers of 
the House of Represe.ntatives. 
The Senators drew attention to the violence and 
repression fhat have plagued East Timar since the 1975 
Indonesian invasion of the island. They spoke of secret 
detention centres beyond the reach of international 
humanitarian organisations, the continued intimidation of 
the clergy and members of the Catholic Church, and 
molnutri t ion and related health problems. They asked 
Schultz to raise these matters in Bali. 
The second congressional letter addressed to Reagon 
spoke of continuing fighting in East Timor, coupled with 
persistent reports of human rights abuses. It expressed 
alarm about the birth control progrCJl'l'rTle in East Timor 
which, according to authoritative ·church sources, "is 
being carried out often without the consent or knowledge 
of the mostly rural population", and called on the 
President to ask the Indonesian government to put a halt 
to such proct ices. It stated that the US should press 
"for a fair and peaceful settlement of the East Timor 
conflict". 
t-ilman rights spotlighted in the US media 
Many reports appearing in the press across the USA in 
advance of the Bali encounter drew attention to 
Indonesia's record as a human rights violator. These 
reflecteCl the concerns raised by the Asia Watch and the 
congressional letters. Comparisons were mode with the 
revelations about the fallen Marcos regime, and many 
corrrnentators stressed that Reagan's pronouncements about 
freedom and democracy lost credibility if a close friend 
like Indonesia was not assessed by the some yardstick 
used for America's foes. 
The article by David Jenkins [see separate item] was 
quoted in many newspapers, completing the picture of the 
Suharto regime as both repressive and corrupt. 
Well in advance of the Reagon visit, the New York Times 
[23 Morch] hod included Suharto as one of the tyrants in 
power in Asia, in on article by its editor-in-chief, 
entitled, "In the Poth of Tyrants". A Washington Post 
columnist, Mory McGrory, accused Reagon of abandoning his 
promise of even-handedness with dictators. She described 
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Suharto as "a murderous right-winger" who "is as corrupt 
as Ferdinand Marcos, as repressive as ••. Pinochet, and .•• 
is trying to wipe out what remains of (East Timer's) 
shrinking population" [Washington Post, 29 April]. In 
another article [Boston Globe, 30 April1 she referred to 
Suharto as a "world-class fascist". 
In fact, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmaja had foreseen the very negative publicity 
that could affect Indonesia's image in the USA when he 
admitted, just one month earlier, that the Marcos debacle 
had concentrated people's attention on human rights in 
other countries. He lamented the fact that "oil countries 
that ore close to the US are now in the limelight. This 
includes Indonesia." [Kompas, 29 March] 
In the days prior to the Bali encounter, White House 
officials insisted that human rights in general and East 
Timor in particular were regarded as "internal matters" 
and would not be raised. But events in Bali on the day of 
Reagan's arrival helped to change that. 
Banned journalists steal the limelight 
Among the hundreds of journalists accompanying Reagan 
were tY{o journalists working for the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission in Washington. The White House 
had never before encountered moves by a country hosting 
the President to exclude journalists in his entourage. 
Suharto's retribution against the press for criticism had 
now affected the White House press corps and 
Administration officials were not prepared to accept 
this. But Indonesia hod already refused permission to 
nine Australian journalists to cover the Bali event and 
was not going to make an exception just to please the 
White House. 
When the two Washington-based journalists were told 
they would be excluded, the new US crribassodor in Jakarta 
spared no effort to hove the decision reversed. Believing 
up to the lost minute that their chances of admission 
were good, the two men boarded the special aircraft in 
Guam. But on arrival in Bali, they were met by police and 
ordered to leave on the next plane out. Final efforts at 
Bali airport by US off iciols foiled to win a reversal. 
To make matters worse, the Bangkok-based New York 
Times journalist, Barbara Crossette, was also ordered to 
leave Bali. Whether this was because of the 29 Morch NYT 
article about Asian tyrants or a recent article by her 
entitled 'Remote Suharto rules with Sultan's air" is not 
clear. But there could hardly have been a less likely 
victim ot Jakarta's wrath. Few foreign journalists have 
served the regime better than Crossette whose reports 
about East Timar several months ago made no attempt to 
investigate anything beyond what she was told by 
This official photograph, of 
President Reagan and President 
Suharto when they met in Bali ot 
the beginning of May, was used 
by most Indonesian newspapers. 
Indonesian officials during a visit to Dili. 
One newspaper commented: "One might expect a nation's 
government to put its best foot forward in such a sudden 
global spotlight, but Indonesian President Suharto 
instead showed the world an all too characteristic 
jackboot. He welcome (Reagan) by mugging the free press." 
[Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 May] Another paper quoted US 
officials in Bali as indicating that "concerns about 
human rights will be raised by the president with 
Suharto, though probably more forecefully by Schultz in a 
separate meeting with Mochtar" [The Sun, 1 May]. 
The hostile mood among the foreign press corps in Bali 
grew worse when copies of the International Herald 
Tribune and the Asia Woll Street Journal turned up with 
huge black splodges, concealing articles critical of 
Suharto and revealing abuses in East Timor. As a result, 
human rights issues and press censorship dominated the 
press briefing by Mochtar in Bali on 1 May. 
According to The Guardian correspondent, Alex Brurrrner 
[2 May], Schultz "chastised Indonesia over press 
censorship and human rights in an unusual public 
reprimand". Brummer pointed out that before the Reagan-
Suharto and other top-level meetings in Bali, White House 
officials had insisted that human rights would be dealt 
with privately, so "last night's public reprimand marked 
a change in posit ion, though it was tempered by praise 
for 'practice of religious freedom"'. 
us ormassador'.s regrets 
US ambassador, Poul Wolfowitz later hoped the long-term 
effects of the Bali events would not be serious. "I very 
much regret the fact that (the expulsions) received far 
greater coverage than more comprehensive reporting about 
Indonesia." Although he refused to reveal what issues hod 
been rois.ed during the top-level talks in Bali, he 
admitted that human rights hod been discussed "in both 
formal and informal meetings" [Tempo, 10 Moy]. 
All in oil, most US corrrnentators agree that Reagan's 
Bali trip was a disaster for Indonesia's image in the 
West. 
[An analysis of the economic and political consequences 
of the Reagan encounter with Suharto and ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers in Bali will appear in the next issue.] 
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Indonesian military map confirms 
Fretilin resistance 
Earlier this year, three maps were smuggled out of East 
Timor, reaching the Fretilin office in Lisbon in March. 
One is an Indonesian military map, captured by Fretilin 
on 3 June 1985. The other two, dated January 1986, are 
Fretilin maps with notes attached, written in the easily 
recognisable handwriting of Kay Rola Gusmao Xanana, 
commander of Falintil, the armed resistance. 
The Fretilin mops ore in colour. One provides detailed 
information about the present position and strength of 
the Indonesian invaders. The other shows the resettlement 
locations, known to the East Ti morese as concentrot ion 
camps, where most Timorese are now forced to live. 
We have reproduced the Indonesian map and the Fretilin 
map which shows Indonesian military strength, combining 
them into a single map. As much detail as possible has 
been retained, without making the map difficult to read. 
The use of colour in the original Fret ii in maps made it 
impossible to reproduce them as received • The Fretilin 
map of concentration camps will be reproduced in the next 
issue. 
The Indonesian map 
This was received in A4 size, crudely duplicated, with 
smudges of duplicating ink making some of the text 
illegible. There is no doubt as to its authenticity. Its 
style and terminology are typical of Indonesian m ii itary 
documents. In the top left-hand corner, badly smudged, is 
thenameoftheWiraDharmaSub-Regional Military Command 
[Korem 164 Wira Dharma]. The map is marked Rahdsia 
(Secret), top and bot.tom, indicating that it is part of a 
military intelligence report. It is dated Dili, March 
(date illegible) and signed by Major Sukeman Kadir, code 
number 26681. With that rank, he could well be chief of 
military intelligence. 
The map bears the title, Lampiran 04/0leat Situasi, or 
Appendix 04, Oleat Situation. The meaning of Oleat is not 
known. It is clear however that this is the fourth 
appendix to an intelligence report, but unfortunately, 
the report and the other appended documents ore missing. 
It divides East Timar into ten districts or sectors 
which Indonesian intelligence have identified as the 
sectors of operation of various Falintil companies. The 
companies and thei rcommanders are named. When compared 
with the Fretilin map, much of the Indonesian information 
proves to be identical, though Xanana has corrected 
commanders' names in several instances. Details of the 
ten sectors as given in the Indonesian map, moving from 
west to east along the south coast (1-8) and from west to 
east along the north coast (9-10), are: 
1. Ki'GerilyaBaratorWest Guerri I la Company, commanded 
by Fenansi Feras. Some is located in this sector. 
2. Ki-B Unidade IV or Unit IV Company E\ commanded by 
Ular/Virgil io. [Due east of 1] 
3. Ki-A Unidade IV or Unit IV Company A commanded by 
Falur/Dorninggus Raul. [Due east of 2] 
According to Xanana's corrections, Unit IV as a whole 
is commanded by Lere, with Selatu Mau as second in 
command. Ular is second in command of Company A, while 
Falur is Political Commissar of Unit IV. 
4. Ki-B Unidade II, commanded by Sabika. [Due east of 3, 
along the south coast.] Viqueque is located in this 
sector. 
5. Ki-A Unidade II or Unit II Company A, commanded by 
David Alex. This sector includes Baucau, Quelicai and 
Baguio. 
6. Ki-B Unidade I or Unit I Company B, commanded by 
(illegible)/Miranda(illegible). [Due east of 5] 
7. Ki-AUnidadelorUnitlCompany A, commanded by Falu 
Txai/Miguel Perera. 
Xanana gives Aluk as the commander of Unit I, with 
Roodak (from Resi Ono Oso Dara Key) as second in command 
and also commander of Company B. 
8. Ki Gerilya Timur or Eastern Guerrilla Company, 
commanded by Cuba/Miguel do Santos. Los Palos is located 
here. 
9. Ki-BUnidadelllorUnit III Company B, commanded by 
Mau Kalu. [Due east of Dili, on the north coast.] The 
town in this sector is Monatuto 
10. Ki-AUnidade 111 or Unit Ill Company A commanded by 
Fero Lofaek/ Agustino Miranda. [Due east of 9.] 
The two names given in the Indonesian map for each of 
the commanders are their nom de guerre, usually a Tetum 
name, and their Portuguese name. 
Fretilin's presence confirmed 
The Indonesian map provides convincing proof of 
Fretilin's presence throughout East Timor from a line 
which, according to Indonesian intelligence, runs from 
the south coast a few kilometres east of Same up to a 
point on the north coast about 30 kilo metres west of 
Manotuto. Fretilin bases are concentrated throughout the 
territory east of this line, with the heaviest 
concentrations in the eastern tip. 
It must be assumed that the original of the Indonesian 
map was in colour. The black-and-white photocopy sent 
abroad conceals certain important distinctions. In 
particular, the map contains many blobs, mostly 
contiguous or overlapping, and the legend distinguishes 
between some which are called daerah logistik. hutan 
(jungle logistic regions) and others which ore called 
basis l<.lasik (classic bases). Since these two types 
cannot now be distinguished, our map shows them simply as 
Fretilin guerrilla bases covering the same area as the 
blobs on the Indonesian map. These blobs show where 
Fretilin forces are concentrated. The territory left 
white is probably where Fretilin guerrilla units are free 
to roam. 
Old and new commanders 
Some commanders' names are familiar. One is Miguel do 
(dos?} Santos, former! y the rajah of Meara, who has been 
Kay Raia Gusmao Xonona, the 
Fretilin leader. This 
photograph was taken in 1983, 
.. along with many photos from 
Fretilin-controlled areas 
smuggled to the outside world. 
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a Falintil commander since the early stages of the war. 
David Alex and Falu Txai were both mentioned in the 1982 
Indonesian m ii itory manuals [See Budiordjo and Liem, The 
War Against East Timor, Zed Books, 1984). They ore among 
the second generation of Fretilin leaders, the ones who 
took over ofter the resurrection of the movement in 1980, 
under Xanona's leadership. Ulor/Virgilio is probably 
Virgi 1 io dos Anjos who surrendered in 1979 and became a 
conscript in the Indonesian Army. He later deserted and 
rejoined Falinti I. As a reprisal, his wife and father 
One of o large collection of photos of Fretilin 
guerrillas received in 1983. 
were executed by the Indonesians during the tragic Kraras 
massacre in August 1983. 
The presence of many new names among the Falintil 
commanders suggest that the guerrillas have no problem 
recruiting new leaders to take command. 
Guerrilla mobility 
The Indonesian map contains the symbols, A and B, and 
I, I I, II I and IV, at the boundaries of the sectors. 
[These details have been left out of the map reproduced 
here.] They probably indicate that the guerrilla 
companies identified operate in sectors on both sides of 
the boundary in question. 
Both Indonesian and Fretilin maps show the stretch of 
territory east of the border with West Timor as being 
under Indonesian control. The shape of this territory is 
the same on both maps, but one detail from the Fretilin 
map is not included on the map produced here. Fretilin 
identifies three autonomous guerrilla units as operating 
in this stretch of country which Xonana calls the 
"pacified region". 
The areas shaded grey, which are controlled by 
Indonesian forces, are reproduced from the Fretilin map. 
Details about roads have been omitted for reasons of 
clarity. There are several roads, one going 10 kilometres 
south fr om Di Ii, one going along the north coast 
eastwards from Manatuto, through Baucou to Los Polos and 
Tutuolu, the Baucou-Viqueque road and roads in the 
vicinity of Los Polos, all of which ore shown by Fretilin 
as being heavily guarded by Indonesian troops, with 
checkpoints. Other tracks hove o lesser security rating, 
though some in the vicinity of Quelicoi and Baguio ore 
shown as being permanently patrolled by Indonesian 
troops. 
Indonesian mi Ii tary presence 
Using symbols to distinguish the strength and 
concentration of Indonesia troops, and the presence of 
orti llery and tonk assault car units, the mop reproduces 
information contained in the Fretilin map regarding the 
spread and density of Indonesian m ii itary presence. The 
locations confirm earlier Fretilin reports about areas 
where guerrilla activities have been escalating and where 
Indonesian troops have had to move in. 
Recent military operations 
A letter to Mgr Martinhu do Costa Lopes, former 
Apostolic Administrator of East Timor, dated 20 February 
1986, reports heightened guerrilla activities in Los 
Polos, Boucou, Viqueque, Monatuto, Same and Ainaro during 
the early months and the last quarter of 1985. The writer 
also described a two-pronged Indonesian concentration and 
encirclement operation moving southwards from Baucou to 
Viqueque early this year. On 6, 7 and 8 February 1986, he 
writes, the Indonesians launched on encirclement 
operation aimed at capturing Fretilin leader Xanana who 
was in the stony mountain range of Matobian, northwest of 
Viqueque, at the time. They mode three attacks, one on 
each day, with many casualties on the Indonesian side. 
Indonesian commander replaced 
The present commander of the East Timor Sub-Regional 
Military Command (Korem 164 Wira Oharma), Infantry 
Colonel Yunus Yosfiah, was appointed to replace Colonel 
Rahardjo on 18 December 1985. Yusuf previously saw 
service as a battalion commander in East Timor. His 
appointment came short! y after a serious defeat for 
Indonesian troops when a Fretilin ambush near Los Palos 
caused between 10 and 15 Indonesian soldiers dead. 
The incident occurred when Major-General Sutorto, 
Commander of the IX Regional Mi 1 itary Command, Kodam 
IX/Udayana, incorporating Korem 164/Wira Dharma, was 
visiting the area. It is not unlikely that this debacle, 
which was reported by foreign agencies, hastened 
Rahardjo's removal. He hod been in the post less than a 
year, which is far shorter than the normal tour of duty. 
Although Indonesian military commanders have tended to 
take a back-seat when foreign visitors come, creating the 
impression of a "province" run by civilians, the new man, 
Yusuf seems to prefer a higher profile. He made his 
presence felt when Australian journalists visited East 
Timor in March 1986, and introduced himself as 'Joe'. 
A senior posting to East Timor is normally a boost to 
an Army officer's coree.r. However, several military 
careers hove been broken by failure to crush Falintil. It 
remains to be seen long Colonel 'Joe' con stay at his 
post, following his failure to capture Xonono lost 
February. 
UDT-FRETILIN 
Joint Statement 
occasional reports no. 2 
T APOL 's Occasional 
Reports No 2 
contains the 24 
Morch 1986 Joint 
Statement by UDT and 
Fretilin, olus 
statements by Moises 
do Costa Amaral for 
UDT, and Abilio 
Araujo for Fret ii i'n. 
Copies on request 
for T APOL. Kindly 
add a donation to 
cover costs when 
requesting three 
copies or more. 
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GERMANY, /NOON ES/A AND EASTTIMOR 
In support of genocide 
When Indonesia lobbies hard this year to 'obliterate' 
East Timar from the UN agenda, it will be able to rely on 
the support of the West German government. Close 
bilateral re lot ions did not commence with the 
conservative government which came to power in 1982. 
Under the Social Democrats, cooperation was already well-
established; only a handful of leftwing Social Democratic 
MPs hod the courage to speak out against supporting one 
of the world's most brutal military regimes. 
Official German policy is guided by economic and 
military interests. Bonn regards Indonesia as o major 
partner in the arms trade and in private investment. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Germon law forbids the sale 
of weapons if they can be used for offensive war, 
Germany's arms trade with Indonesia has increased 
dramatically since Indonesia invaded East Timar in 1975. 
In 1977, the Schmidt Government approved the export of 
two submarines to Indonesia, and in the following years, 
torpedo-bqats, minesweepers and transport aircraft were 
added to the l'ist of equipment supplied to the Indonesian 
Armed Forces. Since April 1984, according to the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, West Germany has become 
the second larger supplier of military equipment to 
Indonesia, after the USA. 
Technological transfer 
Indonesia is now devoting much attention and resources 
to building its own armaments industry, and looks to 
Germany for support. A key figure is Indonesia's Minister 
for Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie who studied 
engineering in Aachen and worked as a senior engineer 
with Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB). Even though he is 
now a minister, he is still on the pay-roll of MBB, a 
glaring example of a conflict of interests. 
Under Habibie's promotion, MBB was one of the first 
arms companies to invest in Indonesia. Together with the 
state aviation company, Nusantaro [formerly Nurtonio], it 
has set up a centre for Indonesian avionics in Bandung. 
In an interview with a Portuguese television crew in East 
Timor in 1983, an Indonesian officer adnitted that they 
were using MBB-rmnfactured BO- 105 helicopters in East 
Timor. The German Ministry of Technology has spent about 
£2.5 million to support MBB investments in Indonesia. 
Other German companies supporting Indonesia's weapons 
industry are Mercedes, Siemens, AEG, MlU and the 
Lurrasen-dockyard. In 1984, The Australian published a 
photo~raph of Indonesian soldiers in Mercedes vehicles on 
the streets of Dili. 
Collaboration in nuclear energy 
West Germany is also supporting the nuclear research 
centre in Serpong, south-west of Jakarta, where a multi-
purpose nuclear reactor MPR-30 is being built. The 
reactor is producing low-concentrate uronfom which is 
suitable for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. 
Germany's contribution to this programme has already 
amounted to £7.5 million. 
A criminal cover-up 
The only way the German Government can justify all this 
collaboration is by denying that Indonesia is waging a 
war against East Timor, and refusing to recognise the 
dictatorial character of the Indonesian regime. Such 
distortions do not seem to worry officials in Bonn. On a 
visit to Jakarta in February 1984, Mr. Carstens, the 
former president of the Germon Federal Republic claimed 
that 'Germany and Indonesia are engaged in making peace 
on earth safer". The official responsible for South and 
South-east Asia at the Deportment of Foreign Affairs puts 
it like this: "Political cooperation with Indonesia is 
very important for the Federal Government. In all 
important international questions, the two countries have 
similar and often identical views, especially over 
Afghanistan and Cambodia." 
Germon government efforts to deny the truth about 
conditions in East Timor started early on. In 1979, when 
the Association for Endangered People and the Corrrni ttee 
Cap Anamur called on the government to support the 
starving people in East Timor, the Foreign Department 
denied that there was any need for help. In a letter to 
the Association dated 7 March, 1980, the Ministry wrote: 
"We can assure you that the situation of the people in 
East Timor greatly inmproved in the last 6 months of 
1979 ...• The Australian and Indonesian governments are, 
moreover, willing to provide assistance until the 
situation stab ii ises." 
In an internal letter, Hall ier, the German ambassador 
in Jakarta, made the preposterous claim that "free 
elections held under UN supervision would see Golkar 
emerge as the victor because, except for a very small 
minority, most people wot1ld certainly vl.)te for the new 
r ·Jlers." 
When a German parliamentary delegation visited East 
Timor in 1984 (without any MPs from the Greens), Bonn 
made use of those parts of their report that were 
favourable to Indonesia for the purposes of lobbying in 
Indonesia's favour at the UN Human Rights Commission in 
Geneva. The critical points contained in the report were 
ignored. When Defence Minister, Worner visited Indonesia 
in November 1985, 87 Social Democrat and 20 Green MPs 
urged him to raise the East Timor issue, but he refused, 
saying that he was going to Jakarta "to discuss security 
in the region •11 
Such cynical disregard for the tragedy Sl•ffered by the 
East Timorese since the Indonesian invasion is the 
hallmark of German official declarations. Thus, in reply 
to questions tabled by the Greens last year, the Foreign 
Minister even went so far as to claim that "there is no 
Indonesian war against East Timor ." 
With' such a record, West German governments of whatever 
political compexion can only be regarded as accomplices 
in genocide. 
/Clemens Ludwig 
Rocket attacks in Jakarta 
Three buildings housing foreign embassies and businesses 
in Jakarta were attacked by rockets and bombs on 14 May. 
None exploded but, according to experts, the launching 
technique used was successful, the same as was used in 
Tokyo during the Summit earlier in the month [Temp», 24 
May]. 
The Japanese embassy was hit by a rocket launched from 
a hotel room opposite. The second rocket, fired from a 
nearby street, landed inside the US embassy compound, 
near the ambassador's office. Then, at Wisma 
Metropolitan, a car blew up in the car-park. This 
accommodates two Hongkong companies, two Singapore 
companies, and three Indonesian companies, among them the 
Bogasori F lourMillingCompony ownedbyl iem Sioe L iong. 
The Indonesian security authorities hove made no 
progress finding the people responsible. A Japanese-based 
Anti-Imperialist International Brigade has claimed 
responsibility, describing the attacks as a response to 
the statement issued by the Tokyo Summit. 
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Japanese MPs reject solution 
of convenience 
The following is the text of a letter sent to the UN Secretary-Genera.1, Peres de Cuellar, by 75 Members of the Japanese 
House of Representatives and House of Council.lors, on 7 December 1986: 
Dear Secretary General, 
As you are a ware, a full decade has now passed since the 
invasion of East Ti mor by Indonesian troops. We address 
yo11 today because we believe in your sincere desire to 
work toward a just and lasting settlement of the East 
Ti mor conflict, a conflict which has already claimed an 
enormous toll in human life, both East Timorese and 
Indonesian. 
We fully support the mandate given to you in Genera.l 
Assembly Resolution 37 I 30 ''to initiate consultations with 
all parties directly concerned" with a view to achieving 
a comprehensive settlement of the East Timar problem. We 
can also well appreciate the great difficulty and 
delicacy of your task.. 
We are disturbed, however, to note that representatives 
of the Ea.st Timorese have yet to be included in these 
deliberations. Earlier this year you reportedly stated in 
press conferences in Jakarta and Tok.yo that discussions 
between "both sides" (Indonesia and Portugal) appeared to 
be moving to ward a solution of the fate of the East 
Timar. Surely you will agree that discussions that do 
not include the East Timorese, notably Fretilin, could 
not possibly lead to any meaningful solution of the fate 
of those same East Timorese. 
Understandably you are anxious to work toward a speedy 
solution of this conflict. However, a cosmetic solution 
which ignores the fundamental right of the East Timorese 
to determine their own fate can only prolong the 
conflict. Furthermore, such a "solution of convenience", 
in contradiction to the very principles upon which tile 
United Nations was founded, could not but be viewed as an 
act of cynicism by the peace-loving people of the world. 
We therefore urge you to include, at the earliest 
possible moment, representatives of the East Timorese, 
notably Fretilin, in the negotiation process. 
Finally, as you are a ware, since 1975, Japan has 
consistently voted in the UN General Assembly and the 
Fourth Sub-Committee against resolutions affirming U1e 
right of the East Timorese to self-determination. The 
fact that the Japanese government has taken this position 
without an adequate survey of the situation and without 
any debate in this country is deeply regrettable. (We) 
pledge to make every effort to widely publicise this 
pressing issue, an issue that invo.lves the fate of an 
entire people, and to actively work. to bring about a 
constructive contribution on the part of Japan. 
The signatories include Members of both the House of 
Representatives and the House of Counci Hors. Sixty-
three ore from the Japanese Socialist Party, and the 
remaining twelve ore from the United Social Democratic 
Porty, the Komei Porty, the Democratic Socialist Porty, 
the New Liberal Party, the Solorymon Shintoh, and the 
Shinsei Club. 
Portuguese premier reiterates support 
for self-determination 
Professor Anibal Cavaco Silva, the Prime Minister of 
Portugal, has re-off irmed his government's support for 
East Timor's right to self-determination. He was speaking 
on a BBC World Service and Radio 4 phone- in prograrrrne on 
11 Moy. 
He said the current consultations between Portugal and 
Indonesia, being held under UN auspices, were initially 
seeking "on answer to the humoni tori on problems that the 
people of East Timor are suffering, and to reduce the 
limitations on freedom for the people living there. We do 
hope that in the near future, it w i 11 be possible to 
reach on understanding under which the people ore given 
the right to express their desire to be port of Indonesia 
or to be separate from Indonesia." 
The Prime Minister was answering a question from Jeon 
Inglis, a leading East Timar activist in Hiroshima. Asked 
about the role of world public opinion and of governments 
such as Japan, he said: 
'We think it is very important to maintain strong 
public opinion pressure on notional governments so that 
they will support the position of Portugal, which is the 
position which defends the right of the people of East 
Timar in the United Notions. So, I appreciate everything 
that is done in Japan to help, not Portugal, but the 
people of East Timor." 
Mochtar aims to 11obliterate11 East Timor internationally 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtor Kusumootmojo, is 
making no secret of his determ inotion to "obliterate" 
EostTimorfrom the UN General Assembly agenda this year. 
In April, he held meetings with Indonesian ambassadors 
throughout the world in Geneva and in New York, to mop 
out a strategy "to resolve the East Timor issue once and 
for all" [Kompas, 29 Morch]. 
The lost time the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution on East Timor was in November 1982. With 50 
votes to 46, the Secretory-General was instructed "to 
initiate consultations with all parties directly 
concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving 
a comprehensive settlement of the problem". Since then, 
the consultations hove involved only Indonesia and 
Portugal, excluding East Timorese representatives. The 
General Assembly has avoided discussing a resolution each 
year because the Secretory-General was unable to report 
any progress, It is thought unlikely there will be 
another postponement this year. 
Self-determination remains the central issue 
Mochtar is obviously upset because, despite all his 
efforts, East T imor's self-determination remains the 
central issue. He is trying to downplay this by claiming 
that, internationally, the emphasis has now shifted to 
"humanitarian issues", and that activities are being 
undertaken only by non-governmental organisations. Yet, 
his much publicised efforts [see, for instance, Sydney 
Morning Herold, 11 Apri 1] to secure a dee i sion at the 
meet ingof Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers 
in New Delhi in April to keep East Timor off the agenda 
of the Movement's summit conference in Zimbabwe in 
September this year, ended' in failure. All he could 
achieve from the New Delhi meeting was a claim that 36 
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NAM member states (less than half the Movement) "have 
vowed to stand on our side" should Vanuatu, Mozambique 
and Angolo raise the issue at this year's General 
Assembly [ Jakarta Post, 21 April]. 
There are more than enough countries who will want to 
raise the question of East Timor's right to self-
determination in Zimbabwe. Even if the issue fails to win 
majority support, it will remain a controversial matter 
for the Non-Aligned Movement which, for Indonesia, is 
almost as bad. This alone could persuade Suharto not to 
attend the 1986 Summit. Yet, only last year, Suharto 
nurtured hopes of becoming chairman of the Movement. 
Mochtar has announced that Indonesia is to open a 
diplomatic mission in Harare to prepare for the NAM 
Summit, and has appointed a special envoy to lobby 
African countries for support on the East Timor issue 
[Jakarta Post, 16 May]. 
Twenty thousand orphans 
There are no fewer than 20,000 orphans in East Timor, 
according to Mario Carrascalao, the puppet governor of 
the Indonesian administration. More than three-quarters 
are in desperate need of help, he told the visiting 
Indonesian Minister for Social Affairs. 
In addition, there are 13,000 widows, 7,000 people whom 
he describes as destitute and some 3,000 prostitutes, all 
of whom ore in need of urgent economic assistance. He 
complained that his administration was not able to cope 
with the needs of these people, and hopes to obtain 
assistance from Jakarta. [ Kompas, 14 April] He did not 
bother to explain why it was that getting on for 50,000 
people, or about 10 per cent of the surviving population, 
were in such desperate straits. 
Indonesian-run elections are no substitute for a referendum 
According to reports from Portugal, the Portuguese 
Government is seriously considering a proposal that a UN 
representative should be sent to observe Indonesia's 
parliamentary election in East Timar to be held in April 
1987. Apparently, a high turnout and a huge majority for 
the army's political wing, Golkar, would justify 
accepting this as a "legitimate act of self-
determinotion", a sign that the East Timorese have 
accepted integration. 
The Portuguese government should be warned that this 
manoeuvre would be an inexcusable betrayal of Portugal's 
obligation to the people of East Timor. First and 
foremost, it is quite illegal for the Indonesian forces 
of occupation to conduct elections in East Timor, and 
there con be no justification for the UN giving the 
elections the cloak of legality by sending on observer. 
The UN correctly refused to observe the "People's 
Assembly" meeting in Dili in July 1976 which Jakarta 
claims was the occasion when East "chose" integration 
with Indonesia. 
1982 elections, a force 
General elections in Indonesia have long been exposed 
as a farce. Golkar [Golongan K arya, or Functional Groups] 
enjoys huge privileges over the two other permitted 
political parties, at every stage of the campaign. The 
farce is even more cynical in East Timor. All indigenous 
East Timorese parties were dissolved or banned as soon as 
the army took control, and Ti morese ore required to 
"choose" between three foreign-imposed parties. 
The first time Jakarta went through the charade of 
holding elections in East Timor was in 1982. The security 
situation in East Timor at the time of the 1977 elections 
was still deemed unfit for such an event. 
The 1982 election results in East Timor were so 
farcical that even The Economist, [8 May 1982] referred 
to them as being "hard to swallow". In the first place, 
the East Timor results were declared before any others, 
within hours ofter polling had ceased. That alone makes 
the claimed results suspect, considering the poor state 
of communications in Indonesia's "youngest province". 
The official returns recorded a turnout of 101.05 per 
cent of the number of voters, with Golkar claiming to 
receive over 99 per cent of the votes cost. The official 
results were: 
Number of voters 
Number of votes cast 
Votes for Golkar 
Votes for PPP 
Votes for PD I 
306,507 
309,734 
308,046 
666 
1,022 
These .figures were published, without comment, in many 
Jakarta dailies on 7 and 8 May, 1982. 
W'idespreod coercion 
Coercion is used throughout Indonesia to ensure a high 
turnout, and to secure a massive majority for Golkar. The 
level of coercion is far worse in East Timor where the 
military play an even more decisive role. Prior to the 
1982 elections, reports were received from East Timor 
about troops forcing people to attend Golkor election 
meetings, or buy T-shirts with Suharto's picture. Refusal 
meant being accused as Fretilin supporters. 
As for Jakarta's claim that the elections were free, 
direct, universal and secret, this was exposed in on 
official publication of the Indonesian Deportment of 
lnformot ion, East Tim or ofter Integration, published in 
July 1983. A photograph on page 92 shows an election 
booth in East Timor. Voters are required to place their 
votes in one of three boxes designated for the three 
parties. There ore six boxes, three for the parliamentary 
election, three for the local assembly election, all 
placed, unconcealed, on the floor, while voting proceeds. 
There was nothing secret about how people voted. No 
wonder Golkor could claim 99 per cent support! 
The GOLKAR Symbol adorned 
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Subversion trials in Jayapura 
Harsh sentences for 1982 flog-raisers 
In Morch, Al'TTlesty International made public the results 
of investigations about nine university students who were 
tried for lowering the Indonesian flag in front of the 
Irion Joya Provincial Assembly building on 3 .Afly 1982. 
They hoisted t he West Papuan Hag in its place and read 
out a proclamation of the West Papuan state. 
Eight men and one woman stood trial. Four of the men, 
Abraham l--legemur, about 28, David Heremba, about 30, 
Ismail Patiran and Simon Tuturup were sentenced to ten 
years. Three men, Karel Patiran, Gerardus Timang and 
Thadius Waripang, got seven years. A man, Otto Rumawcl<, 
and a woman, Josephine Gewab, the wife of David Heremba, 
were sentenced to four years. Josephine Gewab, who is in 
prison together with her daughter, aged three, was 
charged because she sewed the flag. 
On 25 May 1984, four of the men, Abraham Hegemur, David 
HereniJa, Simon Tuturup and Thadius Waripang, were 
transferred to Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya, East Java. 
This means that relatives and friends have no access and 
cannot provide the supplementary food so crucial for 
political prisoners whose food supplies in prison are 
described by Al'TTlesty as "often meagre and inadequate". 
According to information reaching TAPOL in April, five of 
the twelve West Papuans forcibly deported from PNG on 12 
October last year were tried in February and sentenced on 
I March. This source names the five as: .Isaak Hum,paisum, 
Lemach Yoafifi, Edison Yakadewa, Sonny Seseroy and Amos 
Sorondanya. Amnesty Internet ional meanwhile has 
unconfirmed information that seven. were tried. Their list 
excludes Sonny Seseray and includes Elias Kareni, Sam 
Yaro and Lukas Maro. Amnesty also believes that Amos 
Sorondanya was sentenced to nine years, though our source 
reports that no information is yet available about the 
verdicts. 
The lack of specifics about a group of prisoners who 
were visited and interviewed in January this year by a 
group of Australian parliamentarians [see TAPOL Bulletin, 
No 73, March 1986] is syfll>tomatic of the secrecy 
surrounding the fote of West Popuan political prisoners. 
The trials were not open to outside observers, nor were 
the defendants in a position to appoint lawyers of their 
own choice. There is no reason to believe that these men 
had anything approaching a fair trial. 
OPM operations escalate 
News that two OPM guerrilla leaders had surrendered in 
PNG - James Nyaro in the north border region and Gerardus 
Thorny in the south - led many to conclude that OPM was in 
decline. But the opposite appears to be the case. 
Since the latter months of 1985, there has been a 
marked upsurge in guerrilla activity in the north, 
throughout the district [kabupaten] of Jayapura. 
Operations have also been reported in Fakfak, around the 
oil installations. It appears that the OPM have directed 
their operations against foreign companies exploiting the 
territory's mineral wealth, as well as against military 
and police command posts. 
In September, October and November last year, army and 
police posts were attacked in various parts of Tor Atos 
sub-district, well to the west of the provincial capital 
of Jayapura{see map). Then in Urum Guai, or Urunum Guai, 
the local"Ormy sub-district command[kora m n51 was overrun 
and a number of soldiers taken prisoner, as well as the 
sub-district chief [camatJ)' and his assistant. 
The Urum Guai attack came on 26 January, the day before 
twelve West Papuans were whisked out of Irion Jmya by 
Hercules (see TAPOL Bulletil'\ No 74, March 1986). It is 
now known for certain that these men are all in detention 
at Kai isosok Prison in Surabaya, East Java. 
The Woris raid 
But the most spectacular operation took place two weeks 
earlier, when OPM guerrillas attacked and took control of 
Waris, a post near the border with PNG. Most reports 
agree that the post was held for up to two weeks. The OPM 
flag was raised, and bridges and roads were destroyed, 
preventing Indonesian troops from entering the area to 
recapture the post [Niugini Nius, 15 January]. Bulldozers 
used to build the Trans Irion Highway were also burned. 
Altogether about 900 guerrillas were reportedly 
involved in the operation, most of them from the region 
of Wamena, in the highlands to the south-west. Once they 
had secured hold of Waris, one group moved south in the 
direction of Ubrub, another moved north-west in the 
direction of Arso, while a third group stayed behind to 
keep hold of Waris. 
According to PNG press reports, PNG Defence Force 
troops were sent 'on routine patrol' to the border area 
after news of the raid on Waris was received. Although in 
the early stages, PNG officials in Port Moresby and 
Vanimo confirmed that the raid had indeed taken place, 
the PNG government later denied it, as did the 
authorities in Jakarta. Th is led Bernard Narokobi, the 
lawyer who has done so much to help West Papuai refugees 
in PNG, to make a stinging attack on the PNG government 
for concealing the truth. His own sources had revealed 
that two Indonesian soldiers and several Papuans were 
killed during the Waris fighting [ Niugini Nius, 20 
January]. 
PNG and Indonesian armies strengthen 
ties 
Not long after this escalation came the visit to 
Jakarta of Brigadier-General Huai, commander of the PNG 
Defence,Force, the first ever visit of such a senior PNG 
military officer to Indonesia. On his return home, Brig-
Gen. Huai aroused widespread consternation with a 
statement describing the OPM as "a bunch of terrorists" 
which he was resolved to "wipe from the face of the 
earth" [ Niugini Nius, 27 March]. 
Speaking at a press conference in Port Moresby, with 
the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires, Rapilus Ishak, seated 
at his side, Brig-Gen. Huai said it had been agreed, in 
discussions with Indonesian Armed Forces corrmander, 
General Murdani, that PNG and Indonesia would tcl<e the 
same steps on both sides of their c00T110n border to ensure 
the elimination of the OPM. 
Protests came from many circles. Some politicians 
accused him of declaring war on the OPM. Others 
complained that he was making pronouncements on aspects 
of government policy which were not within the competence 
of a military chief, but matters for cabinet ministers. 
There were calls for his dismissal, among others from 
Bernard Narokobi. Several community leaders from PNG 
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border provinces stressed that, whatever the Defence 
Force Chief may soy, PNGions along the border ore and 
will remain deeply sympathetic to the OPM. 
During his stay in Indonesia, Brig-Gen. Huoi visited 
many military establishments and academies. He hos since 
talked about the possibility of purchasing weapons from 
Indonesia and sending officers for training with the 
Indonesian Army. The two countries will also exchange 
military attaches. Indonesia's military ottache in Port 
Moresby was ordered to leave in 1984 when Indonesian 
mili tory aircraft overflew PNG territory and buzzed 
villages on several occasions. 
Prime Minister Wingt i hos since denied there is any 
change in government policy towards the OPM, and said 
that Brig-Gen. Huoi' s remarks hod been "misinterpreted" 
Niugini Ni us, 7 Moy]. 
The OPM's response 
OPM spokespeople in PNG were quick to respond to the 
Defence Force chief's new belligerence. Moses Werror, the 
acting chair in PNG of the OPM's Revolutionary Council, 
warned the General to keep out of OPM's struggle against 
Indonesia. He also warned that guerrillas holding 
Indonesians prisoners would kill them, because that is 
what the Indonesians do with the' OPM fighters they 
capture. Ten Indonesians were under threat, five of them 
captured during a raid on Urungue, some 20 kilemetres 
west of Woris, on 31 Morch. The other five were captured 
near Woris, when OPM was still in control of the post 
[ PNG Times, 1 9 Apri 1 ]. 
Werror also said guerrillas were waging operations 
against two other posts in the region, Sabron and Genjem. 
''The purpose •.• is to hold the stations for as long as 
possible and capture food, ammunition and weapons." 
New corrrnander 
Meanwhile, the newly appointed commander of OPM forces 
in the north border region, Commander Bas Mekowa urged 
Brig-Gen. Huai to stop "trying to destroy the Melanesian 
race and impose Asians in the Pacific". [ PNG Times, 19 
April] 
A few weeks earlier, a Niugini Nius journalist met and 
interviewed Mekawa. This 50-year old former district 
chief [bupat.J.] claimed to be in command of about 7,000 
guerrillas in the region. They are armed primarily with 
axes, bows and arrows, spears and clubs, plus a small 
number of rifles. OPM carries out mobile warfare, its 
only viable strategy against a far better equipped enemy. 
"If they know where we are, they will move in and 
irnnediotely crush us. That's why we're always moving." 
OPM operations against oil installations 
Meanwhile, an AFP report from Jakarta [Niugini Nius, 24 
April] quotes petroleum industry sources as saying six 
Indonesians were killed in several incidents from 10 to 
20 March, near Sarmi1 a town 150 kilometres west of 
Jayapura. This is the region where the Dutch Shell Oil 
company has been engaged in seismic studies. According to 
the same source, six Indonesians were killed, of whom 
three were soldiers and three civi lions working for the 
State-owned petroleum company, Pertamina. The soldiers 
were captured when guerrillas surrounded a bu i I ding and 
hoisted the OPM flag. 
The Podena Shell ins ta I lotion located between Sm mi and 
Jayapura, was attacked twice, on 10 and 11 March. (It is 
not clear whether this installation is on-shore, or 
located on the Podeno group of islands.) On the first 
day, 50 workers and six policemen were surrounded during 
their evening meal and were token hostage. The next 
morning, a similar group including 10 policemen was 
surrounded. Two policemen were shot dead while another 
two were injured [PNG Times, 3 Moy]. 
AFP reports Shell representatives in Jakarta as saying 
they had halted exploration in the area because of the 
attacks. 
Yet more attacks occurred later that month in Betaf 
[Jayapura district] when both the military command 
(Koramil) and the police headquarters (Kosek) were 
attacked. OPM claims to have killed 10 soldiers and 5 
policemen, as well as capturing firearms. 
The most recent attack is reported to have been 
launched.against a police post in Abepura, 15 kilometres 
from Jayapura. A few weeks earlier, the police post at 
Arso, 40 kilometres further south, was set on fire . AFP, 
reporting the incident from Jakarta on 7 May, said the 
report hod been confirmed by religious sources in Irion 
Jayo. 
New Indonesian incursions over the 
border? 
Villagers in three villages in the Fly River valley, 
Aimbak, Obu and Basset, in Western Province, fled their 
villages in fear when two unidentified aircraft flew over 
at tree-top level. According to reports reaching Port 
Moresby, the villagers fled into the bush, fearing that 
this was the start of an Indonesian invasion [Niugini 
Ni us, 15 May]. The same paper reported the next day that 
the villagers were still refusing to return to their 
villages, while government officials were not willing to 
confirm or deny the reports about incursions of PNG air-
space. 
Another sign of growing tensions on the border is a 
report that 200 OPM guerrillas crossed into PNG, near 
Wutung in the north, which led a local official to warn 
people not to go near the border area unti 1 further 
not ice [Niugini Nius, 14 May]. 
A few days later, Brig - General Huai went to Jayapura 
for a hastily-convened meeting with General Murdani . The 
talks were reportedly concerned with security at the 
border before PNG and the UNHCR begin work to relocate 
refugee camps away from the border. The meeting was held 
at Murdani 's request [Niugini Nius, 19 May]. 
OPM operations in Jayapura District 
D i s t r 
Bas Mekawa. [Niugini Nius, 27 March 1986] 
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Refugee family returns to Vonimo 
A woman together with her four children returned to the 
Blackwater refugeecampinVanimo in mid May, complaining 
that they could not cope with living conditions in their 
village in Jayapura district. The report does not specify 
when the fam i 1 y was repatriated, but it stated that she 
appeared before the Vanimo District Court before being 
token bock to Black water Camp [Niugini Nius, 15 Moy]. 
IGG/ ANO TRANSMIGRATION 
PNG accedes to refugees convention 
The PNG Porl ioment accepted o government proposa I 
to accede to the UN 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protoco 1 on Refugees. This undoubted 1 y strengthens 
the position of the UNHCR in the regulation and 
protection of West Papuan refugee affairs. 
Leading members of the opposition parties, which 
refused to involved the UNHCR when they were in pow.er 
up to lost November, vigorously attacked ratification 
of the Convention and Protocol, accusing the Wingti 
Government of "selling PNG 's sovereignty and 
security" [ Niugini Nius, 13 May. 
Western credit likely to increase 
The Dutch chair of the Int.er-Governmental Group-on Indonesia (JGGJ), Hrs Eegje Schoo, gave Indonesia a firm assurance, 
nearly three months ahead of this year's IGGI meeting, that at least $2.4 billion of financial assistance will be 
supplied to Indonesia for 1986 / 87. She hinted that Indonesia might get more than this to tide it over its present 
economic difficulties. The JG GI would also try, she said, to ''improve the quality of its assistancen by providing a 
higher proportion in non-repayable grants so as to reduce the burden on Indonesia's future deby repayment obligations. 
Up to September 1985, Indonesia's external debt had 
reached $24.8 bi II ion. To this must be added the $2.4 
billion allocated by the IGGI at its 1985 meeting, which 
will bring the overall total later this year to around 
$27.2 billion. 
The IGGI is an international aid consortium of western 
countries, managed by the World Bank. It was set up in 
1967, just as the massacres that followed Suharto's 
seizure of power, which took the 1 ives of an estimated 
one m ii 1 ion people, were subsiding. The member 
governments are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
German Federal Republic, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US. A number of governments 
attend as observers, including Austria, Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden. The other multilateral agencies involved are 
the' Asian Development Bank, UNDP and the European 
Community. 
Schoo, who is Dutch Minister for Development 
Cooperation, made her annual, pre-IGGI session visit to 
Indonesia far earlier than usual. The IGGI meeting is not 
due until the last week of June. This ties in with 
Jakarta's acute budgetary problems. The 1986/87 budget, 
announced in January, cut overall spending by 7 per cent 
and slashed "development" expenditures by 22 per cent. 
This was based on an assumed oil price of $25 a barrel. 
But with the price now hovering at half that, the 
military government is going to hove to revise the budget 
drast i colly. 
With the economy in dire straits, foreign economic 
assistance, for so long an important prop to the system, 
has now become more crucial than ever. The Indonesian 
budget is required by law to be balanced, but this is 
only achieved with the help of substantial foreign aid 
amounting to about 17 per cent of revenues. 
In addition to Indonesia's official foreign debt of 
$27.2 billion, there is on estimated $5-7 billion 
private-sector debt. The For Eastern Economic Review [27 
March 1986) points out that for the first time this year, 
foreign debt due for repayment is running higher than new 
credit coming in. "This year, US$1.16 billion will be 
paid out for every dollar of credit or aid. Debt service 
is climbing, estimated at 27-30 per cent based on net 
eY.ports i'ncome." 
During the oil boan, oil and natural gas provided 65 to 
70 per cent of Indonesia's State revenue and about 70 per 
cent of its foreign exchange earnings. The current budget 
cuts oil's share of government income to 55 per cent. It 
is increasingly apparent that Jakarta's efforts to boost 
non-oil exports are foundering. Hence, the hasty 
consultations with IGGI, to be followed no doubt by 
strenuous efforts from The Hague to muster greater 
support in the West for Indonesia's flogging economy. The 
western powers are well aware that the current economic 
decline, burgeoning unemployment and rising prices could 
unleash social unrest in a country regarded as enjoying 
"sound political stability", to quote the new US 
ambassador to Jakarta, Paul Wolfowitz. The scale of 
represi;ion employed to maintain this "sound political 
stability" was not mentioned. 
IGGI and the Indonesian economy 
At the outset IGGI funding was essential to the 
Suharto government. It covered the huge deficit between 
state income and expenditure and helped finance the 
running expences of the Army and the bureaucracy, thus 
contributing to the consolidation of military rule. It 
also gave Suharto a breathing space by re-scheduling the 
$2.5 billion foreign debt inherited from the Sukarno era. 
By the late 1970s, o i 1 revenues hod become the mainstay 
of the regime but IGGI credits continued to increase, 
supporting o range of "development" projects. In fact, 
these funds flowed in faster than they could be used up, 
and current estimates of unused IGGI credits vary from $2 
billion to $9 billion! This might appear to mean that 
IGGI funding could be cut, but this simple logic does not 
apply to western funding institutions faced with debt-
crisis countries and collapsing Third World tyrannies. 
Despite the economic decline, Indonesia's credit rating 
is still high and the banks con earn plenty of interest 
from loans to Indonesia. 
IGGI enthusiastic about 
transmigration 
The other striking feature about Schoo's visit to 
Indonesia this year was, her strident support for 
transmigration. She is well aware of the campaign now 
gathering steam against the prograrrrne. Indeed the Dutch 
Government hos been involved in o lengthy correspondence 
with Survival International, trying to defend itself by 
denying irrefutable evidence that The Hague has been 
supportive of the progrorrme in o number of ways. 
Her visit to Indonesia culminated in o six-day trip to 
West Papua, where she sow several model transmigration 
sites located in Koyo Borot, near Jayapura. She used 
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every opportunity to express admiration for the 
"contribution transmigration has made to the economic 
development of Irion Joya" [.Jm<:arta Post, 9 April]. 
She made it clear she was not interested in the "issue" 
of Javanisation. "I understand it very well. The Javanese 
are the majority, so it is quite proper that they should 
exert an influence over a wide area. The important thing 
is, how the government should be running the 
transmigration programme better" [Tempo, 12 April]. 
Finantial support for transmigration will be on the 
IGGI agenda this year, according to Schoo. Taking an 
apparent swipe at the information published in the 
Mayl986 edition of The Ecologist, Schoo said "the IGGI 
considers only authentic information from financial 
institutions like the World Bank" and is. not interested 
in matters like Javanisation. 
Martono defends land-grabbing 
Following consultations with the Mrs Schoo, Indonesia's 
Minister of Transmigration, Martono spoke at length about 
land acquisition for transmigration sites. He claimed 
that land used for transmigration must first be converted 
into "state land" and this is done by traditional 
communities "voluntarily" surrendering their land to the 
state. No compensation is paid for land surrendered for 
transmigration, though the dispossessed communities can 
become participants in the transmigration programme, and 
obtain a share of the land [Peli ta, 2 April, 1986 ]. 
Martono apparently believes that such "voluntary" land 
seizures are acceptable because they are accompanied by a 
traditional land-acceptance ceremony. He took part in a 
ceremony to receive 300,000 hectares surrendered by 
tribes in Timika district for the transmigration 
programme. These tribal lands were then distributed to 
transmigrants as their private property. Some local 
inhabitants were also given land certificates which 
meant, he said, that instead of owning the land 
collectively as before, it was now their private property 
[Kornpas, 2 April]. It is apparently inconceivable to 
Martono that tribal people might actually prefer to own 
their land collectively. 
[For a full discussion of transmigration as it affects 
traditional land rights, see Marcus Colchester, "The 
Struggle for Land: Tribal Peoples in the Face of the 
Transmigration Progrorrme" in The Ecologist, Vol. 16, No. 
2/3, 1986.) 
Copies of The Ecologist are available from T APQ for 
£2.00, including dispatch, or £3.00 airmail. 
Mrs Eegje Schoo meets a 
West Popuon. [Tempo, 12 
April, 1906] 
65 mi 11 ion to be transmigrated in 
twenty years 
The Minister for Transmigration, Martono, hos admitted 
that Indonesia intends to re-settle 65 million people 
from Java, Bali and Lombok to the outer islands, in the 
next 20 years. "In fact, we hope to move even more, if we 
possibly con." [Kompos, 12 May] 
Mortono was responding to a report from Washington that 
Marcus Colchester of Survival International had called on 
the World Bark to stop aiding Indonesia's transmigration 
prograrrme. The Minister was clearly ruffled by the attack 
on the programme. He accused Survival of not knowing the 
problems and of pursuing an 'issue' [a pejorative term in 
official discourse] in order to discredit the government. 
His statement focussed on Survival's criticism of the 
widespread degradation of Indonesia's tropical forest 
land and of the destruction of tribal people's life-
styles. In fact, he confirmed both things. He admitted 
that tropical forests were being cut down because the 
programme needs huge amounts of land. He justified the 
undermining of tribal people's lives by claiming that 
they would, like all other ethnic groups, be fully 
absorbed into a single Indonesian nation. 
He said Survival would be invited to come to Indonesia 
to see the prograrrme for themselves. 
World bank should stop funding 
transntigration 
The current issue of The Ecologist., produced jointly with Survival International and TA POL, contains six major articles 
analysing Indonesia's transmigration programme. The editorial takes the form of a letter addressed to the Retiring 
President and the President Elect of the World Bank, Hr Clausen and Hr Conable. The letter reads as follows: 
We are writing to you to express our grove concerns 
regarding the World Bank's continued funding of the 
Transmigration Programme in Indonesia. 
The programme, which involves the mass movement of 
millions of landless poor from the central Indonesian 
islands of Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok to the less 
densely populated outer islands, has been promoted as a 
humanitarian exercise with the primary goal of improving 
living standards. The promotion of regional development 
through the provision of the necessary manpower to the 
outer islands, and the strengthening of notional unity 
through increasing ethnic integration are also given as 
objectives of the programme. 
Yet evidence continues to accumulate that even the 
major humanitarian rationalisations for the programme are 
flowed. The widespread failure of Transmigration sites 
and the increasing numbers of settlers engaged in 'second 
round flows' testify to this. 
Of particular concern to us is the impact that this 
project is having on the forests and peoples of the outer 
islands. Transmigration, as it is presently being carried 
out, is leading to the permanent and effectively 
irreversible destruction of vast areas of tropical 
forest. Over 3.3 million hectares of tropical forest will 
be destroyed by Transmigration during the present five 
year plan. In addition, the destabilised populations From 
unsuccessful sites are causing further widespread 
environmental damage, as the settlers abandon their 
failed sites and lay waste the surrounding vegetation. 
Moreover, as the recent Forest Review, carried out by 
three lndonesi an Government Departments and the 
International Institute for Environment and Development, 
hos emphasised, even where sites are successful, serious 
environmental problems arise, since these areos serve to 
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draw less fortunate settlers to them, placing an 
unsustainable burden on the fragile tropical forest 
environment. 
Current rates of deforestation in Indonesia have become 
a cause of global concern, estimates placing the overall 
rate of forest loss at over one m ii I ion hectares per 
year. Transmigration exacts a major part of this terrible 
toll. We would draw your attention to the conclusion of 
the Forest Review team, where they state: 
Given the current objectives and operational procedures 
of the Transmigration Programme, the Team considers 
Transmigration as the single sectoral activity with the 
greatest potential to advance forest destruction -
often to no constructive result. Whether a 'success' or 
'failure' by present standards, Transmigration, as 
currently managed, can only hove negative implications 
for forest resources. 
[Review of Issues Affecting the Sustainable Development 
of Indonesia's Forest Lands, GOl/IIED, 1985, Vol 11:62] 
Such CJ conclusion makes clear that the Transmigration 
Programme is entirely incompatible with the World Bank's 
own environmental policy guidelines, where the Bonk 
states that it: 
9i;i. Endeavours to ensure that each project affecting 
renewable natural resources (e.g. as sink for residue or 
as a resource for raw material) does not exceed the 
regenerative capacities of the environment; 
9b. Will not finance projects that cause severe or 
irreversible environmental deterioration, including 
species extinctions without mitigatory measures 
acceptable to the Bank ... [Environmental Policies and 
ProceduresoftheWorld Bonk, Office of Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs, May 1984] 
Transmigration takes as its starting point the 
assumption that the outer islands are 'underpopulated' 
and 'underdeveloped'. Yet, in fact, these areas are the 
traditional homelands of a large number of viable and 
vigorous societies which have developed sophisticated 
systems of resource use subtly adapted to their 
prevailing environmental circumstances. Transmigration, 
by alienating these peoples from their traditional lands 
and forcing them to participate in development projects, 
many of which are environmentally and economically 
inappropriate, is destroying the very basis of their ways 
of life. 
Traditional land rights 
subordinated to state interests 
As you will be aware, Indonesian low, while ostensibly 
recognising traditional [adatJ land rights, completely 
subordinates these rights to State interests [Basic 
Agrarian Law No 5, 1960]. Special legislation relating to 
Transmigration further weakens these rights. For example, 
Clause 17 of the Basic Forestry Act, Clarification Act No 
2823 of 1967, states: 
The rights of traditional law communities may not be 
al lowed to stand in the way of the establishment of 
Transmigration sites. 
The effect of these and other laws is to deny the land 
rights of tribal peoples practising non-sedentary forms 
of land use. Compensation payable to these people is 
1 im i ted to payment for the destruction of their standing 
crops and buildings but not for loss of their hunting, 
gathering and fishing territories. Instead of respecting 
the rights of tribal peoples to their traditional lands 
and resources, Government pol icy obi iges these peoples to 
abandon their traditional ways of I ife, leaving them with 
no alternative but to integrate into Transmigration 
settlements where they find themselves outnumbered by 
outsiders and despised for their ' primitive' customs. In 
many provinces, Transmigration is leading tribal peoples 
to become a minority in their own lands. 
The dispossession that is an i~evi~ab!e part ?f 
Transmigration is causing an escalation in t~ter-ethmc 
tensions. Particularly in West Papua (Irion. Jayo), 
tribals who have resisted the takeover of their lands 
have been accused of being members of proscribed 
secessionist movements and have been subjected to 
security operations by the Indonesian armed f~rces. These 
actions are leading to a bloody escalation of the 
conf I ict between tribal people and the military. In West 
Papua, which, with a total population of 1.2 milli~n, hos 
been designated to receive about 685,000 settlers an the 
next five years, there hove been w idespreod reports of 
human rights abuse associated with the programme. 
One of the most worrying and evident expressions of the 
problems Transmi grotion is causing is the continuing 
exodus of tribal people from West Papua into neighbouring 
PapuaNewGuinea.According to the UN High Commission for 
Refugees, there ore presently 10,500 refugees in camps 
all along the border, including about 500 new arrivals in 
Ille last few months [ Refugees, F ebruory 1986 ]. Successive 
reports from those in direct communication with the 
refugees have noted that land alienation, resulting 
primarily from the Transmigration programme, bas been a 
major cause for their flight. Refugees report the bombing 
of villages, indiscriminate shooting, imprisonment, 
torture, rape, the burning of settlements and the killing 
and stealing of I ivestock [The Status of Border Crossers 
from Irion Jayo to Papua New Guine~ Report by the 
International Commission of Jurists, Australian Section, 
January 1985]. 
Breaching the World Bank's 
own guidelines 
Taken together, these facts make it abundantly clear 
that Transmigration as it is being implemented is 
directly contravening the terms of the World Bank's 
guide I ines for the development of tribal areas [Tribal 
Peoples and Economic Development: Human Ecological 
Considerations, World Bank, 1982). 
Moreover, it is clear that these violations of human 
rights are not just the result of poor planning and 
implementation at the local level but are inherent in the 
legislation and policy of the programme. The ethnocidal 
intent of Transmigration was made abundantly clear at the 
special seminar on Transmigration hosted by the Minister 
of T ransm igrat ion, Martono, on 20 March, 1985, where he 
stated: 
On 28 October 1928, a youth congress was held 
concluding that we ore one nation, the Indonesian 
nation; we have one native country, Indonesia; one 
language, the Indonesian language. By way of 
Transmigration, we will try to realise what hos been 
pledged, to integrate all ethnic groups into one 
nation, the Indonesian nation ..• The different ethnic 
groups will in the long run disappear because of 
integration .•. and there will be one kind of man •.. 
[Proceedings of the Meeting between the Department of 
Transmigration and the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia, Jakarta, 20 Morch 1985: 4.41 ]. 
The Bank, in its policy guidelines, has explicitly 
rejected such integrationist policies towards tribal 
peoples [World Bank 1982, op.cit: 27], instead insisting 
on an 'intermediate policy' which 'allows the retention 
of o large measure of tribal autonomy and cultural 
choice'. This has nowhere been provided for in the 
Transmigration programme. 
T ransm igrat ion and notional security 
The Indonesian Government has stated that 
Transmigration is considered of great important as an 
exercise in promoting 'national security'. As General 
Murdani, the commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Armed 
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Forces made clear in March last year, Transmigration is 
considered to be 'the only programme in the economic 
fi~ld that must quite categorically be tied in with 
defence and security considerations .•. The preparation of 
sites and the removal of obstacles to land availability 
need to be given special focus because the choice of 
locations is related to the concept of territorial 
management ... ' [Sinor Harapan, 8 March 1985). In West 
Papua, these concerns are manifested in the Government's 
plans to settle a 'cordon sanitaire' of militarised 
[saptamarga) settlements along the border. In November 
last year, the Minister of Transmigration, Martono, 
announced that Transmigration was to be given a priority 
m border areas ( Kompas, 6 November 1985). 
In view of the considerable and steadily growing 
evidence that widespread environmental and human rights 
abuses are not only associated with but actually integral 
to the present manner of the Transmigration Programme's 
implementation, we strongly urge that the Bank carefully 
reviews its present policy of supporting the project. 
While this is being carried out, we also strongly urge 
that the Bank takes immediate steps to halt funding the 
programme. Funding for Transmigration should not be 
renewed until there are guarantees that it is to be 
carried out in 1 ine with the Bank's guidelines for the 
development of tropical forest regions and areas 
inhabited by tribal peoples and that it will not lead to 
the destruction of the environment, the alienation of 
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tribal peoples from their lands and the abuse of their 
right to self-determination. 
We look forward to learning how you plan to deal with 
this matter. 
The lettPr was signed by representatives of 35 hum an 
rights and environmentalist organisations from countries 
all over the world. 
ORDER YOUR COPY NOW 
The Ecologist 
BANKING ON DISASTER 
Indonesia's Transmigration Programme 
SURVIVAL INTERNATIONAL 
FOR THE RIGHTS OF THREATENED TRIBAL PEOPLES 
B111ishCampa1gn !or !he Oetenceot Pollhcal 
Prosone1sarn1 Human R1ghl s 1n Indonesia 
Available from T APOL Price, £2.00 including dispatch, or 
£3.00 including dispatch by air. 
The HMI and Pancasila 
The enactment last year of the Societies' Law requiring all social and political organisations to accept Pancasila as 
their sole ideology has caused profound internal conflict in many organisations. But nowhere has the conflict been as 
fierce as that still raging in the Himpunan Hahasiswa Islam (Federation of Islamic Students). 
At the end of March this year, the HMI ended a gruelling 
week-long congress in Padang, West Sumatra by formally 
announcing the adoption of Pancasila as the sole-ideology 
of the organisation. The HMI was the last leading 
organisation in the country to comply with the regime's 
dictat. This proves to have been achieved only as the 
result of intense and blatant intervention by persons 
scheming on the government's behalf. At its last national 
congress in mid 1983 in Medan, delegates unanimously 
rejected the 'sole-ideology' requirement and passed a 
resolution retaining the HMl's Muslim identity, despite 
strong government pressure. 
HM! is the largest and by far the most influential 
students' organisation in Indonesia. Established in 1947, 
it has always been popular among students, and now has a 
membership of about 150,000, spread throughout all the 
main university centres. After a brief period as the 
student organisation of the former Masyumi party, it 
relinquished formal links with any of the political 
parties. Its independence and tradition of steering clear 
of ties with any government institutions has helped 
preserve the organisation's autonomy. 
The most striking feature about HMI is its pengkaderan 
activities, its focus on the creation of cadres. As an 
Islamic organisation with a strong modernist outlook, it 
has never concentrated on Ku'ranic recitations but 
focussed rather on political discussion and leadership-
training. As a result, many prominent Muslim 
intellectuals today originate from HMI ranks. 
HMI and the rulers 
In the guided democracy period (1959-1965) of Sukarno's 
presidency, the HMI came under strong attack from the 
left, but efforts to have it banned along with Masyumi 
were unsuccessful. After Suharto seized power in 1965, 
HMI was in the vanguard of the Student Action Front 
(KAMI) which rallied support in the major cities for the 
Army's anti-communist crusade. 
But the honeymoon between HMI and the military did not 
last long. In the seventies, the student protest 
movements of 1974 and 1978 were led predominantly by HMI 
student activists. Then, the relative freedom that still 
existed in those days on university campuses was 
effectively destroyed by counter-measures. The law on 
'Normalisation of Campus Life' [NK K] mode it impossible 
for student organisations to engage in any 'non-
educational' actions, thus excluding rallies, protest 
meetings and demonstrations that had figured so 
strikingly in the 1974 and 1978 movements. 
When the 1983 congress took place, the Societies' Law 
was still two years away, yet the organisation was 
already warned that a law on Pancasila-as-the-sole 
ideology was in the making. The congress nevertheless re-
affirmed HMl's Musi im identity. But since then, 
intimidation and pressure from the government has been 
relentless. Many branches were forced to succumb or had 
their elected boards replaced. The star performers in 
this tour de force were two former HMI activists, long 
since co-opted by the regime and given very comfortable 
posts. Abdul Gafur, formerly chairman of HMl-Jakarta, is 
now Minister for Youth and Sport6 Affairs. Akbar Tanjung, 
formerly HMI chairman, is now the deputy Secretary-
General of the government party. Golkar. Tanjung recently 
took over the chief editorship of Pelita, until recently 
the organ of the Muslim rump party, PPP. These two have 
been instrumental in forcing HMI to submit. 
As wi thothermainstreamMuslim organisations, manyHMI 
activists have been 'transformed' into 'Muslim 
Pancasi laists', serving to give the regime an Islamic 
image. The process of such transformation varies and 
usually occurs behind closed doors. It is not difficult 
to imagine what emoluments must have been offered to 
'lubricate' the change of gear. Thus, a fellow known to 
have resisted government pressure appears a few months 
later in a very different guise. This happened fo Harry 
Azhar Aziz, elected HMI chairperson in 1983. In those 
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days, he was adamant 1 y opposed to compliance with the 
sole-ideology requirement. By the end of his term, he 
had, by his own admission, been 'mellowed' by Abdul 
Gafur, and emerged at this year's congress as a loyal 
support of sole-ideology. 
It is now abundantly clear that during 1985, battles 
raged in HMI between the two poles. As the 1986 congress 
drew near, the biggest branches in Jakarta, Bandung, 
Jogjakarta and Ujung Pandang together with five other 
branches, were still solidly against the transformed Aziz 
leadership and declared their intention to boycott the 
Padang congress. The organisation's central board 
therefore 'disbanded' the dissenting branches and created 
new ones in their place, to avoid open clashes during the 
congress. 
Despite all the pre-congress rigging, Padang turned out 
to be a fierce battle-ground. The Pancasila principle was 
indeed accepted, but many issues were bitterly contested 
even though the radical wing was not present. 
A chairman dropped from outer space 
Many sessions were marked by rowdy and furious clashes. 
But the most extraordinary machinations centred around 
the election of the organisation's hew chairman. Heated 
controvery had broken out over the candidates, al 1 of 
them in one way or another acceptab:e to the regime. 
Congress however baulked over the leading candidate who 
happened also to be chairman of a provincial branch of 
the regime's umbrella youth organisation, KNPI. This 
combination of roles was too much for even pro~regime 
Party politics sink to new depths 
The Indonesian Democratic Party, or POI, which ranks as 
the smallest of the country's three political parties, 
was recently reduced to pleading with the government to 
chose its chairman, after its national congress almost 
broke up in a brawl. 
The POI came into existence through the forced merger 
in 1973 of three parties, the Nationalist Party, Parkindo 
(Protestants) and Partai Katolik. From the outset, this 
unseemly coalition has been ridden with conflict, much of 
it the result of meddling by military intelligence. But 
POi's first two congresses were relatively smooth 
affairs, for the Minister of the Interior of the time, 
General Amir Machmud, stage-managed things well ahead of 
time, hand-picking the delegates to achieved the desired 
results. Since those halcyon days, however, Amir's 
ministry has passed into the hands of General Supardjo 
Rustam, a man who turns out to be less adept at the 
highly specialised skill of stage-managing parties. 
Dog-fighting for the chair 
The POI Congress was concerned with one question, and 
one question only - the choice of a leader. With more 
leeway than usual from the military, the several party 
big-shots all believed they had sufficient 'backing' to 
romp home with the prize! for the party chairmanship is 
indeed a prize, even in such a powerless party as the 
PD I. The chairman is sure to become a member of the 
Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), a vice-chairman of 
parliament, and to be appointed to other prestigious 
positions. 
The Congress was opened on 15 April by no less a person 
than Suharto himself, and wa5 due to last two days. But 
while the state dignitaries were gathering for the 
closing session, the dog-fighting was bordering on open 
warfare. In desperation delegates greeted with 
undisguised relief a proposal to leave everything to the 
Government. So, the task of picking a chairman fell to 
General Supardjo, the one who had failed so dismally to 
'fix' the Congress. 
Ultimately, the man chosen was Suryadi, a complete 
outsider, plucked from the shadows. But the approval of 
delegates to accept, so it appeared that he was about to 
be voted down. 
Then, completely out of the blue, Akbar Tanjung 
produced 'his man', M. Saleh Khalid, summoned to the 
congress from Bogar tw.o days before the congress wm. due 
to close. In a straight run with another regime 
candidate, Tanjung's man was elected. Commentators, 
aghast at the brazen disregard for procedure, are still 
talking about this astonishing coup de grace. 'Dropping', 
by the way, is a well-worn Indonesian expression for the 
government's imposition of its favoured appointees to 
keep organisations on the Pancasilaist line. 
Dissenting HMI branches 
The nine dissenting branches meanwhile took their own 
counter-measures, creating a new forum coiled Hajelis 
Penyelamat Organisasi, or Council to Save the 
Organisation. They have occupied the main HMI head office 
in Jakarta, and appear to be determined not to allow 
their organisation to be over-run by regime hatchet-men. 
Speaking on behalf of the new organisation, M. Choiron, 
chairman of HMI-Jogjakarta said: "We represent the 
aspirations of 23,000 HMI members." 
Dissent is a rare phenomenon on the Indonesian 
political scene. As a result, the HMI saga is being 
watched with great interest, even, one may say, with 
bated breath. Armed Forces commander, General Murdani, 
warned HMI, just a few days before the Padang congress: 
"Anyone who rejects the Pancasila might as well pack 
their bags and leave the country". With such forces 
arrayed against them, it remains to be seen how long the 
HMI dissidents will be able to stand their ground. 
one general was not enough. His appointment could not be 
made public until it had obtained the blessings of 'four 
wise men', Supardjo and three other generals, Golkar 
chairman Sudharmono, Armed Forces ConTnander Benny 
Murdani, and General Moerdiono, Minister/Secretariat of 
the Cabinet. No-one seems to be very sure who Suryadi 
is, except that somehow, he represents the infusion of 
'new blood', a kind of mini-version of the regeneration 
now under way in the Armed Forces leadership. 
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